Article: Revenue Effects of the Global Minimum Tax Under Pillar Two

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW
Intertax Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI:10.54648/taxi2022074
Mona Baraké, Paul-Emmanuel Chouc, Theresa Neef, G. Zucman
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

In October 2021, 137 countries and jurisdictions agreed to implement a major reform of the international corporate tax system, i.e., a global minimum tax of 15% on the profits of large multinational companies. This article presents simulations of the revenue effects of the global minimum tax. Two possible scenarios are considered regarding who collects the minimum tax: The country in which the headquarters are located based on the income inclusion rule (IIR) or the host country of foreign affiliates as laid out under the qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) tabulated country-by-country report (CbCR) statistics are complemented with data by Tørslov, Wier, and Zucman (2020). Based on a sample of eighty-three parent countries, it is estimated that headquarters countries could collect a total revenue of EUR 179 billion globally. The EU Member States could receive EUR 67 billion from a 15% minimum top-up tax. Carve-outs, provisions that decrease the tax base for real economic activity, reduce the potential tax revenues by approximately 14% to 22% over the entire sample. Under the current agreement, the European Union can expect a total tax revenue of EUR 55 billion yearly. The analysis accentuates how the distribution of revenues varies depending on which country has the priority to collect. Under the IIR in which the headquarters country collects the top-up tax, a country receives more revenues when it hosts more headquartered multinationals. With qualified domestic top-up taxes that give the host country of the foreign affiliate the priority to collect the top-up tax, low-tax jurisdictions that have attracted affiliates of many multinationals could be among the main beneficiaries of the reform. Static estimates that take the distribution of profits and taxes paid as given, are presented. Thereafter possible behavioural effects that may affect the estimates are discussed. International taxation, tax deficit, global minimum tax
文章:第二支柱下全球最低税的税收效应
2021年10月,137个国家和司法管辖区同意对国际公司税制度进行重大改革,即对大型跨国公司的利润征收15%的全球最低税。本文模拟了全球最低税对收入的影响。对于由谁来征收最低税额,有两种可能的情况:根据收入包含规则(income inclusion rule, IIR),总部所在地的国家或根据合格国内最低充值税(qualified domestic minimum supplement tax, QDMTT)规定的外国子公司所在国。经济合作与发展组织(OECD)的国别报告(CbCR)统计数据与Tørslov、Wier和Zucman(2020)的数据相补充。根据83个母国的样本,估计总部国家可以在全球范围内收取1790亿欧元的总收入。欧盟成员国可以从15%的最低补足税中获得670亿欧元。在整个样本中,削减实体经济活动税基的条款使潜在税收收入减少了约14%至22%。根据目前的协议,欧盟预计每年的税收总额将达到550亿欧元。该分析强调了收入分配如何根据哪个国家优先征收而变化。在总部所在国征收补足税的国际税收制度下,当一个国家拥有更多总部的跨国公司时,它获得的收入就会更多。由于合格的国内补足税使外国子公司所在国能够优先征收补足税,吸引了许多跨国公司子公司的低税率司法管辖区可能成为这项改革的主要受益者之一。给出了静态估计,将利润和税收的分配作为给定。然后讨论可能影响估计的行为效应。国际税收,税收赤字,全球最低税
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来源期刊
Intertax
Intertax LAW-
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
50.00%
发文量
45
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