‘Stand up like a Taiwanese!’: PRC coercion and public preferences for resistance

IF 1.1 3区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE
J. I. Chong, David W. F. Huang, Wen-Chin Wu
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the ‘92 Consensus’ and ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and ‘cheap talk’ theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations.
“像台湾人一样站起来!”:中国的胁迫和公众的抵抗偏好
摘要自2016年以来,台湾反对中国的要求,如接受“九二共识”和“一国两制”方案,招致北京采取了一系列报复措施,旨在迫使台湾遵守。鉴于经济规模、军事能力和外交地位的明显不对称,台湾为研究以威胁惩罚为形式的胁迫外交提供了一个案例。物质上的分歧表明台湾应该投降,“廉价谈判”的论点预计中国的威胁不会产生明显的影响,而威胁平衡的论点预计会得到解决。在这篇文章中,我们使用2016年、2019年和2020年台湾国家安全研究中收集的调查数据,研究台湾人如何应对中国日益加剧和扩大的威胁。我们的论文确定了四种公众认为是对中国胁迫的回应的策略:孤立、追随中国、通过与美国和日本结盟来平衡中国,以及通过深化与中国的经济关系来对冲,同时与美国和日本人结盟来对抗中国。我们表明,随着中国胁迫的加剧,台湾公民越来越认为中国是一个威胁,民众对平衡中国的支持也在上升。我们的研究结果表明,尽管在能力和物质限制方面存在严重的不对称,但自由民主国家的公民可以培养出反抗威权政权压力的意愿。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: The Japanese Journal of Political Science is a broadly based journal aiming to cover developments across a wide range of countries and specialisms. Its scope is wide-ranging both in terms of subject matter and method. The journal features articles in all fields of political science, especially where these have a conceptual thrust including political theory, comparative politics, political behaviour, political institutions, public policy, and international relations. At the same time, the journal seeks to attract the best comparative articles featuring both the domestic and international politics of Japan and East Asia. Each issue contains full length research articles, review articles and book reviews.
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