Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence

IF 1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Paul Silva
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for a range of debates in epistemology. Most startlingly, it undermines the idea that having strong evidence for the truth of p is necessary for it to be rational to believe p . The rationality of self-fulfilling beliefs is here defended against the idea that their rationality is incompatible with a compelling closure principle.
自我实现的信念:一种防御
至少在某些情况下,自我实现的信念是在缺乏证据的情况下形成和坚持的一种信念。这种信念的合理性对认识论的一系列争论具有重要意义。最令人吃惊的是,它破坏了相信p是理性的,就必须有强有力的证据来证明p的真实性这一观点。自我实现信念的合理性在这里是为了反驳它们的合理性与强制性封闭原则不相容的观点。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
51
期刊介绍: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (AJP) is one of the world''s leading philosophy journals. Founded in 1923, it has been continuously published ever since. It is recognized as one of the best in the analytic tradition, but is not narrow in what it regards as worthy of acceptance. Heavily cited in the general philosophical literature, it is covered by all the major abstracting and indexing services, including the Arts and Humanities Citation Index® which provides access to current and retrospective bibliographic information and cited references found in the world''s leading arts and humanities journals. In addition to Articles and Discussion Notes, the journal publishes Book Reviews and Book Notes as well as occasional commissioned Critical Notices. The journal is read world-wide and has recently published contributions from North and South American, European and Asian as well as Australasian authors.
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