Non-Cash Auction for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: Contract Theoretical Model With Joint Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

IF 13.8 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC
Yanru Zhang, Lingyang Song, M. Pan, Z. Dawy, Zhu Han
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引用次数: 35

Abstract

In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods require full payment from SU, which blocked many potential “buyers,” and thus limited the PU’s expected income. To better improve PUs’ revenue from spectrum trading in a CRN, we introduce a financing contract, which is similar to a sealed non-cash auction that allows SU to do financing. Unlike previous mechanism designs in CRN, the financing contract allows the SU to only pay part of the total amount when the contract is signed, known as the down payment. Then, after the spectrum is released and utilized, the SU pays the rest of payment, known as the installment payment, from the revenue generated by utilizing the spectrum. The way the financing contract carries out and the sealed non-cash auction works similarly. Thus, contract theory is employed here as the mathematical framework to solve the non-cash auction problem and form mutually beneficial relationships between PUs and SUs. As the PU may not have the full acknowledgment of the SU’s transmission status, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arise in the two scenarios, respectively. Therefore, a joint adverse selection and moral hazard model is considered here. In particular, we present three situations when either or both adverse selection and moral hazard are present during the trading. Furthermore, both discrete and continuous models are provided in this paper. Through simulations, we show that the adverse selection and moral hazard cases serve as the upper and lower bounds of the general case where both problems are present.
认知无线电网络频谱交易的非现金拍卖:具有联合逆向选择和道德风险的契约理论模型
在认知无线电网络中,频谱交易是辅助用户实现动态频谱接入、为主用户带来经济效益的有效途径。现有的方法需要SU全额付款,这阻碍了许多潜在的“买家”,从而限制了PU的预期收入。为了更好地提高运营商从CRN频谱交易中获得的收入,我们引入了一种融资合同,类似于密封的非现金拍卖,允许运营商进行融资。与CRN中之前的机制设计不同,融资合同允许SU在签订合同时只支付总金额的一部分,即首付款。然后,在频谱被释放和使用后,SU从使用频谱产生的收入中支付剩余的款项,即分期付款。融资合同的执行方式与密封的非现金拍卖方式相似。因此,本文采用契约理论作为数学框架来解决非现金拍卖问题,形成PUs与SUs之间的互利关系。由于PU可能对SU的传播状态没有充分的认识,因此在两种情况下分别出现逆向选择和道德风险问题。因此,本文考虑了逆向选择和道德风险的联合模型。具体来说,我们给出了交易过程中存在逆向选择和道德风险的三种情况。此外,本文还提供了离散模型和连续模型。通过模拟,我们发现逆向选择和道德风险情况是同时存在这两个问题的一般情况的上界和下界。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) is a prestigious journal that covers various topics related to Computer Networks and Communications (Q1) as well as Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Q1). Each issue of JSAC is dedicated to a specific technical topic, providing readers with an up-to-date collection of papers in that area. The journal is highly regarded within the research community and serves as a valuable reference. The topics covered by JSAC issues span the entire field of communications and networking, with recent issue themes including Network Coding for Wireless Communication Networks, Wireless and Pervasive Communications for Healthcare, Network Infrastructure Configuration, Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols, Body Area Networking: Technology and Applications, Underwater Wireless Communication Networks, Game Theory in Communication Systems, and Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow’s Communication Networks.
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