Equilibria and oscillations in cheat-cooperator dynamics.

Abstract

Cooperative societies can be threatened by cheats, who invest less in cooperation and exploit the contributions of others. The impact of cheats depends on the extent to which they are maintained in the population. However, different empirical studies, across organisms ranging from RNA replicators to bacteria, have shown diverse cheat-cooperator dynamics. These vary from approaching a stable equilibrium to dynamic cyclical oscillations. The reason for this variation remains unclear. Here, we develop a theoretical model to identify the factors that determine whether dynamics should tend toward stable equilibria or cyclical oscillations. Our analyses show that (1) a combination of both periodic population bottlenecks and density-dependent selection on cheating is required to produce cyclical oscillations and (2) the extent of frequency-dependent selection for cheating can influence the amplitude of these oscillations but does not lead to oscillations alone. Furthermore, we show that stochastic group formation (demographic stochasticity) can generate different forms of oscillation, over a longer time scale, across growth cycles. Our results provide experimentally testable hypotheses for the processes underlying cheat-cooperator dynamics.