{"title":"Pandemics, economic freedom, and institutional trade-offs.","authors":"Vincent Geloso, Kelly Hyde, Ilia Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1007/s10657-021-09704-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We argue that institutions are bundles that involve trade-offs in the government's ability to provide public goods that affect public health. We hypothesize that the institutions underlying economic freedom affect the mix of diseases by reducing diseases of poverty relative to diseases of commerce (those associated with free movement of people, such as smallpox or COVID-19). We focus on smallpox and typhoid fever in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in order to build on recent work that make arguments similar to ours, especially the framework Werner Troesken sets forth in <i>The Pox of Liberty</i>. Our evidence shows that economic freedom, in multiple periods of time and settings prior to the eradication of smallpox in the second half of the twentieth century, reduced typhoid mortality but had no effect on smallpox deaths. The implication for COVID-19 is that the trade-off between fighting the pandemic and preserving economic freedom may not be too severe in the short run. However, in the long run, the wealth benefits from economic freedom are likely to be crucial in reducing vulnerability to diseases of commerce primarily from their impact on comorbidities (such as diabetes and heart disease). Thus, economic freedom is on balance good for public health, which suggests that it, while requiring trade-offs, might be the best institutional bundle for dealing with pandemics.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10657-021-09704-7.</p>","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10657-021-09704-7","citationCount":"27","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-021-09704-7","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2021/7/19 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27
Abstract
We argue that institutions are bundles that involve trade-offs in the government's ability to provide public goods that affect public health. We hypothesize that the institutions underlying economic freedom affect the mix of diseases by reducing diseases of poverty relative to diseases of commerce (those associated with free movement of people, such as smallpox or COVID-19). We focus on smallpox and typhoid fever in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in order to build on recent work that make arguments similar to ours, especially the framework Werner Troesken sets forth in The Pox of Liberty. Our evidence shows that economic freedom, in multiple periods of time and settings prior to the eradication of smallpox in the second half of the twentieth century, reduced typhoid mortality but had no effect on smallpox deaths. The implication for COVID-19 is that the trade-off between fighting the pandemic and preserving economic freedom may not be too severe in the short run. However, in the long run, the wealth benefits from economic freedom are likely to be crucial in reducing vulnerability to diseases of commerce primarily from their impact on comorbidities (such as diabetes and heart disease). Thus, economic freedom is on balance good for public health, which suggests that it, while requiring trade-offs, might be the best institutional bundle for dealing with pandemics.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10657-021-09704-7.
期刊介绍:
The European Journal of Law and Economics provides readers with high-quality theoretical and empirical research in which both the legal and economic dimensions merge and combine. The journal welcomes articles that promote a better understanding of legal phenomena, legal decisions made by judges, courts or regulatory agencies, and involving economic tools. Theoretical papers are welcome, provided they have a strong basis in law and economics. We also welcome case studies, as well as empirical analyses – including empirical legal studies – and experimental investigations. The European Journal of Law and Economics does not favor any particular topic, but does have a focus on new and emerging problems. European themes are particularly welcome, because we feel it is important to exploit Europe’s considerable institutional diversity in order to build a more robust body of theory and empirical evidence. However, the purpose of the journal is also to showcase the diversity of law and economics approaches, as supplied by an international mix of authors. Drawing on the support of respected scholars from around the world, who serve as consulting editors and editorial board members, the Editors wish to give contributing authors the opportunity to improve their papers, while also offering them a quick and efficient review process.
Officially cited as: Eur J Law Econ