The Role of Philosophy After the Empirical Turn in Bioethics.

Abstract

In “The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today,” Blumenthal-Barby and colleagues argue that philosophy is indispensable to the field of bioethics (Blumenthal-Barby et al. 2022). Nonetheless, they identify an underrepresentation of philosophers in funded bioethics projects. They contrast “more foundational normative and conceptual work” with “typically funded empirical bioethics and preference surveys,” and quote a report that identifies the focus on empirical studies to be a weakness of funding organizations, as it disregards the importance of philosophical work. We do not deny the importance of more foundational normative and conceptual projects, and agree that not all bioethicists need to be doing practice-focused work. However, we argue that the empirical turn in bioethics as such does not make philosophy obsolete; rather, it implies a specific and indispensable role of philosophy. This only adds to the three arguments of Blumenthal-Barby et al.: The important role of philosophy in empirical bioethics is a fourth way in which philosophers remain highly relevant to the interdisciplinary domain that is bioethics. Empirical ethics is a general term for “methodologies that seek to use empirical data about stakeholder values, attitudes, beliefs and experiences to inform normative ethical theorizing” (Davies, Ives, and Dunn 2015). It departs from the assumption that exploring stakeholders’ views and experiences informs and enhances ethical analysis, as it makes ethicists more contextually aware and more grounded in the realities of lived experience, and provides better, more workable solutions for ethical problems (Leget and Borry 2010). In our view, the role of philosophy in empirical ethics is twofold. First, philosophical analysis can provide much-needed reflection on the methodological and epistemological presuppositions of empirical ethics. Second, philosophical work is needed in order to interpret empirical results and to come to normative conclusions. Let us first go into the role of philosophy regarding reflection on the presuppositions of empirical ethics. It has been argued that the very notion of empirical ethics is problematic, as it seems to be at odds with the is–ought distinction. How can factual statements about, for instance, stakeholder beliefs result in conclusions with normative force? Various ways have been proposed for taking into account stakeholder views in normative bioethics work (Musschenga 2005). One is the reflective equilibrium approach, in which the ethicist weighs the normative intuitions of stakeholders against other relevant normative considerations (Van Thiel and Van Delden 2009). Another is the dialogical approach, in which the ethicist organizes a process of deliberation with stakeholders in order to come to joint normative conclusions that are primarily consensus based (Widdershoven, Abma, and Molewijk 2009). However, methodologies in empirical ethics are diverse and evolving (Davies, Ives, and Dunn 2015). Thus, there is still a lack of reflection on what justifies, both theoretically and methodologically, going from empirical data of stakeholders’ intuitions and judgments to normative conclusions in a certain way, and whether there is one approach to be preferred, in general or in specific situations. Such philosophical scrutiny is and remains important, as empirical ethics is a further developing field. The second role of philosophy in empirical ethics pertains to the contribution of philosophers to actual empirical ethics work. Empirical ethics is not necessarily antagonistic to theoretical normative ethics. Although some approaches to empirical bioethics marginalize the role of philosophical theory, prioritize