Making Sense of Sanctions: An Agent-Based Model of Sanction Recognition.

Abstract

Theories of norm emergence are a central building block for comprehending the emergence of society. The article investigates a central terminus in theories of norms, in particular rational choice theory: The notion of sanctions. Sanctions are an unexplained theoretical term for securing norm conformity. Agent-based models inspired by evolutionary game theory show that the evolution of cooperation can be enforced by sanctions. However, in behavioral terms, sanctions are a form of aggression. An empirical investigation of the violent collapse of a criminal group reveals that interpretation is necessary for recognizing aggression as sanction. Whereas theories of norms attempt to explain the emergence of social structure, successful sanction recognition imposes the existence of social structure in the form of normative authorities. In the absence of social structure for securing social order such as the state monopoly of violence this interpretation remains ambiguous and error prone. Simulation experiments with an agent-based model investigate the conditions for the emergence of a normative authority.