Public and private incentives for self-protection.

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review Pub Date : 2020-01-01 Epub Date: 2020-07-21 DOI:10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3
François Salanié, Nicolas Treich
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a "collective offsetting effect", since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.

公共和私人鼓励自我保护。
政府有时鼓励或强制采取个人自我保护措施,例如在疫情期间在公共场合佩戴防护口罩。然而,通过减少被他人感染的风险,更多的自我保护可能会导致每个人更频繁地走出家门。在没有封锁的情况下,这产生了一种“集体抵消效应”,因为更多的人在外面意味着所有人的感染风险都在增加。然而,戴口罩也会通过降低感染他人的风险,对他人产生积极的外部性。我们展示了如何在一个简单的模型中整合这些不同的影响,并讨论了何时应该鼓励(或阻止)社会规划师的自我保护努力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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