The Protection of Patients Under the Clayton Act.

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Fordham Law Review Pub Date : 2018-04-01
Elizabeth S Kraus
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The vast consolidation among health-care providers in the aftermath of the Affordable Care Act's enactment has led to much debate over the benefits of mergers in the health-care industry. In 2016, the Federal Trade Commission filed motions in federal court to enjoin three hospital mergers in various parts of the country. This amounted to more challenges to hospital mergers in a single year than any year in recent history. Though two of these motions succeeded at the district court level, both were overturned on appeal, which led many to wonder what the effect of these decisions would be on future health-care mergers. While many fear that hospital mergers lead to higher prices for consumers, there are also those who contend that mergers lead to efficiencies, which allow merging parties to utilize resources more effectively, increase the quality of patient care and coordination, and potentially save lives. This Note argues that the possibility of quality-enhancing or life-saving efficiencies is worth the risk that consumers see increased prices. To allow mergers that may realize these types of efficiencies, antitrust enforcement agencies and courts must begin placing greater weight on merging parties' efficiency arguments by easing the current standard. Additionally, in light of new research suggesting that cross-market health-care mergers, or mergers between providers in different geographic markets, affect bargaining dynamics between providers and insurers, this Note argues that parties' relative bargaining power must be considered in agencies' and courts' analyses of the competitive landscape relevant to a merger.

根据克莱顿法案保护病人。
《平价医疗法案》(Affordable Care Act)颁布后,医疗服务提供商之间的大规模整合引发了有关医疗行业合并好处的许多争论。2016年,联邦贸易委员会向联邦法院提出动议,禁止全国各地的三家医院合并。这相当于在一年中医院合并的挑战比近代历史上任何一年都要多。虽然其中两项动议在地方法院获得了成功,但都在上诉中被推翻,这让许多人怀疑这些决定对未来医疗保健合并的影响。虽然许多人担心医院合并会给消费者带来更高的价格,但也有人认为合并会提高效率,这使得合并方能够更有效地利用资源,提高患者护理和协调的质量,并可能挽救生命。本说明认为,为了提高质量或挽救生命的效率,值得冒着消费者看到价格上涨的风险。为了允许可能实现这些效率的合并,反垄断执法机构和法院必须开始通过放宽目前的标准来更加重视合并方的效率论点。此外,鉴于新的研究表明,跨市场的医疗保健合并或不同地域市场的提供者之间的合并会影响提供者和保险公司之间的议价动态,本说明认为,在机构和法院对与合并有关的竞争格局的分析中,必须考虑各方的相对议价能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
12.50%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Fordham Law Review is a scholarly journal serving the legal profession and the public by discussing current legal issues. Approximately 75 articles, written by students or submitted by outside authors, are published each year. Each volume comprises six books, three each semester, totaling over 3,000 pages. Managed by a board of up to eighteen student editors, the Law Review is a working journal, not merely an honor society. Nevertheless, Law Review membership is considered among the highest scholarly achievements at the Law School.
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