Suffrage for People with Intellectual Disabilities and Mental Illness: Observations on a Civic Controversy.

Abstract

Most electoral democracies, including forty-three states in the United States, deny people the right to vote on the basis of intellectual disability or mental illness. Scholars in several fields have addressed these disenfranchisements, including legal scholars who analyze their validity under U.S. constitutional law and international-human-rights law, philosophers and political scientists who analyze their validity under democratic theory, and mental-health researchers who analyze their relationship to scientific categories. This Note reviews the current state of the debate across these fields and makes three contentions: (a) pragmatic political considerations have blurred the distinction between disenfranchisement provisions based on cognitive capacity and those based on personal status; (b) proposals that advocate voting by proxy trivialize the broad civic purpose of the franchise; and (c) the persistence of disenfranchisement on the basis of mental illness inevitably contributes to silencing socially disfavored views and lifestyles. Accordingly, the Note cautions reformers against advocating for capacity assessment or proxy voting, and emphasizes the importance of disassociating the idea of mental illness from voting capacity.