{"title":"[The characteristics of altruistic behavior that can sustain generalized exchange in a society composed of two groups].","authors":"Ryoichi Onoda, Nobuyuki Takahashi","doi":"10.4992/jjpsy.87.14080","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Previous studies on generalized exchange have argued that group plays an important role in the emergence\nof cooperative society. To examine to what extent the role of a group is important, we conducted computer\nsimulations in which players decide whether to give resources to members of a society composed of two groups.\nWe examined whether a society consisting of any of the possible conceivable strategies (65536 strategies total)\ncould resist invasion by an unconditional defector (ALLD) and an unconditional cooperator (ALLC). The\nresults showed that universalist strategies, which give resources to both in-group members and out-group\nmembers equally, and in-group favoring strategies, which give resources to in-group members more than outgroup\nmembers, could resist invasion. Furthermore, we found that in-group favoring strategies could exclude\nALLC from the circle of resource flow more easily than universalist strategies. These results imply that it may be\nnecessary to employ an in-group favoring strategy that utilizes the group membership information of other people\nin order to maintain generalized exchange in a society composed of two groups.</p>","PeriodicalId":53680,"journal":{"name":"Shinrigaku Kenkyu","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Shinrigaku Kenkyu","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4992/jjpsy.87.14080","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Psychology","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Previous studies on generalized exchange have argued that group plays an important role in the emergence
of cooperative society. To examine to what extent the role of a group is important, we conducted computer
simulations in which players decide whether to give resources to members of a society composed of two groups.
We examined whether a society consisting of any of the possible conceivable strategies (65536 strategies total)
could resist invasion by an unconditional defector (ALLD) and an unconditional cooperator (ALLC). The
results showed that universalist strategies, which give resources to both in-group members and out-group
members equally, and in-group favoring strategies, which give resources to in-group members more than outgroup
members, could resist invasion. Furthermore, we found that in-group favoring strategies could exclude
ALLC from the circle of resource flow more easily than universalist strategies. These results imply that it may be
necessary to employ an in-group favoring strategy that utilizes the group membership information of other people
in order to maintain generalized exchange in a society composed of two groups.