Personhood, Welfare, and Enhancement.

Abstract

The debate on enhancement ethics cannot escape some of the deeper questions troubling the concept of personhood. That is, in a sentence, my reading of Robert Sparrow’s target article (Sparrow 2022). This development is significant for enhancement ethics, because personhood has assumed the grounding role once played by human nature. Thinking in terms of effects on persons (instead of on human nature) fits in with liberal approaches to enhancement, where enhancements are either like life choices to be regulated along libertarian principles, or like goods such as education to be regulated along principles of fairness. Genetic enhancement in particular can be subsumed under parental autonomy: parents choosing the best for their child. However, insofar the liberal approach rests on the metaphysical fulcrum of personhood, problems with the latter reverberate throughout enhancement ethics. In this commentary I will add two problems to those already identified by Sparrow: one regarding person-affecting enhancement, and the other regarding identity-affecting enhancement.