Scaling cost-sharing to wages: how employers can reduce health spending and provide greater economic security.

Christopher T Robertson
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Abstract

In the employer-sponsored insurance market that covers most Americans; many workers are "underinsured." The evidence shows onerous out-of-pocket payments causing them to forgo needed care, miss work, and fall into bankruptcies and foreclosures. Nonetheless, many higher-paid workers are "overinsured": the evidence shows that in this domain, surplus insurance stimulates spending and price inflation without improving health. Employers can solve these problems together by scaling cost-sharing to wages. This reform would make insurance better protect against risk and guarantee access to care, while maintaining or even reducing insurance premiums. Yet, there are legal obstacles to scaled cost-sharing. The group-based nature of employer health insurance, reinforced by federal law, makes it difficult for scaling to be achieved through individual choices. The Affordable Care Act's (ACA) "essential coverage" mandate also caps cost-sharing even for wealthy workers that need no such cap. Additionally, there is a tax distortion in favor of highly paid workers purchasing healthcare through insurance rather than out-of-pocket. These problems are all surmountable. In particular, the ACA has expanded the applicability of an unenforced employee-benefits rule that prohibits "discrimination" in favor of highly compensated workers. A novel analysis shows that this statute gives the Internal Revenue Service the authority to require scaling and to thereby eliminate the current inequities and inefficiencies caused by the tax distortion. The promise is smarter insurance for over 150 million Americans.

将费用分摊扩大到工资:雇主如何减少医疗支出并提供更大的经济保障。
在雇主赞助的覆盖大多数美国人的保险市场;许多工人“保险不足”。有证据表明,繁重的自付费用导致他们放弃必要的护理,失去工作,陷入破产和丧失抵押品赎回权的境地。尽管如此,许多收入较高的工人“过度投保”:有证据表明,在这一领域,保险盈余刺激了支出和价格通胀,而没有改善健康状况。雇主可以通过将成本分摊到工资中来共同解决这些问题。这项改革将使保险更好地防范风险,保证获得医疗服务,同时保持甚至降低保险费。然而,规模分摊成本存在法律障碍。联邦法律加强了雇主健康保险以群体为基础的性质,这使得通过个人选择实现扩大规模变得困难。平价医疗法案(ACA)“基本覆盖”的规定也限制了费用分摊,甚至对不需要这种上限的富有工人也是如此。此外,存在税收扭曲,有利于高收入工人通过保险购买医疗保健,而不是自掏腰包。这些问题都是可以克服的。特别是,ACA扩大了一项未强制执行的雇员福利规则的适用性,该规则禁止“歧视”高收入工人。一项新的分析表明,该法规赋予了美国国税局(Internal Revenue Service)要求扩大规模的权力,从而消除目前由税收扭曲引起的不平等和低效率。承诺将为超过1.5亿美国人提供更明智的保险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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