{"title":"Automatic control of visual selection.","authors":"Jan Theeuwes","doi":"10.1007/978-1-4614-4794-8_3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper seeks out to reduce the role of the homunculus, the 'little man in the head' that is still prominent in most psychological theories regarding the control our behaviour. We argue that once engaged in a task (which is a volitional act), visual selection run off more or less in an automatic fashion. We argue that the salience map that drives automatic selection is not only determined by raw physical salience of the objects in the environment but also by the way these objects appear to the person. We provide evidence that priming (feature priming, priming by working memory and reward priming) sharpens the cortical representation of these objects such that these objects appear to be more salient above and beyond their physical salience. We demonstrate that this type of priming is not under volitional control: it occurs even if observers try to volitionally prepare for something else. In other words, looking at red prepares our brain for things that are red even if we volitionally try to prepare for green.</p>","PeriodicalId":54204,"journal":{"name":"Nebraska Symposium on Motivation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Nebraska Symposium on Motivation","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4794-8_3","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Psychology","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Abstract
This paper seeks out to reduce the role of the homunculus, the 'little man in the head' that is still prominent in most psychological theories regarding the control our behaviour. We argue that once engaged in a task (which is a volitional act), visual selection run off more or less in an automatic fashion. We argue that the salience map that drives automatic selection is not only determined by raw physical salience of the objects in the environment but also by the way these objects appear to the person. We provide evidence that priming (feature priming, priming by working memory and reward priming) sharpens the cortical representation of these objects such that these objects appear to be more salient above and beyond their physical salience. We demonstrate that this type of priming is not under volitional control: it occurs even if observers try to volitionally prepare for something else. In other words, looking at red prepares our brain for things that are red even if we volitionally try to prepare for green.