'Linkage' pharmaceutical evergreening in Canada and Australia.

Thomas A Faunce, Joel Lexchin
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

'Evergreening' is not a formal concept of patent law. It is best understood as a social idea used to refer to the myriad ways in which pharmaceutical patent owners utilise the law and related regulatory processes to extend their high rent-earning intellectual monopoly privileges, particularly over highly profitable (either in total sales volume or price per unit) 'blockbuster' drugs. Thus, while the courts are an instrument frequently used by pharmaceutical brand name manufacturers to prolong their patent royalties, 'evergreening' is rarely mentioned explicitly by judges in patent protection cases. The term usually refers to threats made to competitors about a brand-name manufacturer's tactical use of pharmaceutical patents (including over uses, delivery systems and even packaging), not to extension of any particular patent over an active product ingredient. This article focuses in particular on the 'evergreening' potential of so-called 'linkage' provisions, imposed on the regulatory (safety, quality and efficacy) approval systems for generic pharmaceuticals of Canada and Australia, by specific articles in trade agreements with the US. These 'linkage' provisions have also recently appeared in the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUSFTA). They require such drug regulators to facilitate notification of, or even prevent, any potential patent infringement by a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer. This article explores the regulatory lessons to be learnt from Canada's and Australia's shared experience in terms of minimizing potential adverse impacts of such 'linkage evergreening' provisions on drug costs and thereby potentially on citizen's access to affordable, essential medicines.

“联动”制药常见于加拿大和澳大利亚。
“常绿”不是专利法的正式概念。最好将其理解为一种社会观念,用于指制药专利所有者利用法律和相关监管程序扩展其高租金知识垄断特权的无数方式,特别是在高利润(无论是总销量还是单位价格)方面。“一鸣惊人”的药物。因此,虽然法院是药品品牌制造商经常使用的工具,以延长其专利使用费,但“常绿”很少被法官在专利保护案件中明确提及。该术语通常指的是品牌制造商对药品专利的战术使用(包括使用,输送系统甚至包装)对竞争对手造成的威胁,而不是对活性产品成分的任何特定专利的延伸。本文特别关注所谓的“联动”条款的“常青”潜力,这些条款通过与美国的贸易协定中的具体条款强加于加拿大和澳大利亚仿制药的监管(安全、质量和疗效)批准系统。最近在韩美自由贸易协定(KORUSFTA)中也出现了这种“联动”条款。他们要求这些药品监管机构促进通知,甚至防止仿制药制造商潜在的专利侵权。本文探讨了从加拿大和澳大利亚的共同经验中吸取的监管教训,以最大限度地减少这种“联动常绿”条款对药品成本的潜在不利影响,从而可能对公民获得负担得起的基本药物产生不利影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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