{"title":"For your first born child: an ethical defense of the exploitation argument against commercial surrogacy.","authors":"Brendan Osberg","doi":"","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this essay I explore two arguments against commercial surrogacy, based on commodification and exploitation respectively. I adopt a consequentialist framework and argue that commodification arguments must be grounded in a resultant harm to either child or surrogate, and that a priori arguments which condemn the practice for puritanical reasons cannot form a basis for public law. Furthermore there is no overwhelming evidence of harm caused to either party involved in commercial surrogacy, and hence Canadian law (which forbids the practice) must (and can) be justified on exploitative grounds. Objections raised by Wilkinson based on an 'isolated case' approach are addressed when one takes into account the political implications of public policy. I argue that is precisely these implications that justify laws forbidding commercial surrogacy on the grounds of preventing systematic exploitation.</p>","PeriodicalId":87452,"journal":{"name":"Penn bioethics journal","volume":"2 2","pages":"42-5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Penn bioethics journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this essay I explore two arguments against commercial surrogacy, based on commodification and exploitation respectively. I adopt a consequentialist framework and argue that commodification arguments must be grounded in a resultant harm to either child or surrogate, and that a priori arguments which condemn the practice for puritanical reasons cannot form a basis for public law. Furthermore there is no overwhelming evidence of harm caused to either party involved in commercial surrogacy, and hence Canadian law (which forbids the practice) must (and can) be justified on exploitative grounds. Objections raised by Wilkinson based on an 'isolated case' approach are addressed when one takes into account the political implications of public policy. I argue that is precisely these implications that justify laws forbidding commercial surrogacy on the grounds of preventing systematic exploitation.