{"title":"Transfer regulations and cost-effectiveness analysis.","authors":"Eric A Posner","doi":"","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recent scholarship on regulatory oversight has focused on cost-benefit analysis of prescriptive regulations--regulations that restrict behavior such as pollution--and their use to cure market failures, and has overlooked the vast number of transfer regulations. Transfer regulations are regulations that channel funds to beneficiaries. These regulations are authorized by statutes that establish entitlement programs like Medicare and Social Security, pay one-time distributions to victims of misfortunes such as natural disasters and the 9/11 terrorist attack, and fund pork barrel spending. Cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations because all transfer regulations fail cost-benefit analysis; cost-effectiveness analysis, however, can be used to evaluate transfer regulations. Although executive orders appear to require agencies to use cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations that have a large economic impact, the agencies' record is dismal. Most agencies fail to perform cost-effectiveness analysis, and other agencies perform cost-effectiveness analysis incorrectly. More vigorous Office of Management and Budget and, possibly, judicial review could improve the quality of distributive regulations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47625,"journal":{"name":"Duke Law Journal","volume":"53 3","pages":"1067-110"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2003-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Duke Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Recent scholarship on regulatory oversight has focused on cost-benefit analysis of prescriptive regulations--regulations that restrict behavior such as pollution--and their use to cure market failures, and has overlooked the vast number of transfer regulations. Transfer regulations are regulations that channel funds to beneficiaries. These regulations are authorized by statutes that establish entitlement programs like Medicare and Social Security, pay one-time distributions to victims of misfortunes such as natural disasters and the 9/11 terrorist attack, and fund pork barrel spending. Cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations because all transfer regulations fail cost-benefit analysis; cost-effectiveness analysis, however, can be used to evaluate transfer regulations. Although executive orders appear to require agencies to use cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations that have a large economic impact, the agencies' record is dismal. Most agencies fail to perform cost-effectiveness analysis, and other agencies perform cost-effectiveness analysis incorrectly. More vigorous Office of Management and Budget and, possibly, judicial review could improve the quality of distributive regulations.
最近关于监管监督的学术研究主要集中在指令性法规(限制污染等行为的法规)的成本效益分析，以及它们用于治疗市场失灵的作用，而忽视了大量的转移监管。转移条例是指将资金输送给受益人的条例。这些规定是由法律授权的，这些法律建立了医疗保险和社会保障等福利项目，向自然灾害和9/11恐怖袭击等不幸事件的受害者支付一次性款项，并为猪肉桶支出提供资金。成本效益分析不能用于转移法规的评价，因为所有转移法规都不能进行成本效益分析;然而，成本效益分析可用于评价转让条例。尽管行政命令似乎要求各机构使用成本效益分析来评估具有重大经济影响的转移监管，但各机构的记录却令人沮丧。大多数机构没有进行成本效益分析，还有一些机构的成本效益分析不正确。管理和预算局(Office of Management and Budget)更有力的管理和预算局(Office of Management and Budget)，以及可能的司法审查，可以提高分配法规的质量。
期刊介绍：
The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.
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