Political economy of hospital financing.

F Breyer, F Schneider
{"title":"Political economy of hospital financing.","authors":"F Breyer,&nbsp;F Schneider","doi":"10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper we tried to explain the recent reform in the law of financing German hospitals. We first described five basic types of hospital payment systems which were available as alternatives to the decision on the reform in the early 1980s. In the next step we identified five concerned interest groups whose actions certainly had a great influence on the legislative process. We proposed a simple theoretical model to examine how these groups of actors evaluated the different payment systems. After deriving a preference ranking for each actor, we confronted these rankings with the respective revealed preferences, which could be inferred from their official statements towards the reform. It could also be shown that quite often the actual statements deviated strongly from the theoretically expected preferences because all groups were engaged in a highly interactive lobbying game. In the last step we compared these preferences to the actual outcome of the legislation and found that all groups have at least partly realized their targets. So in contrast to the typical results of interest group theory, the differences in bargaining power do to appear to have led to a solution which unambiguously benefits some groups of actors at the expense of others. It has to be repeated that the empirical analysis was limited to statements from the interest groups in the pre-legislative stage of the whole process. From this point the most promising procedure would appear to be the step-by-step analysis of the statements of the groups during the legislative process as well. This would give the researcher a chance to evaluate whether or not the theoretical hypotheses can be confirmed, whether or not our simple theoretical model is an appropriate way to understand the behavior of the affected groups and what was finally responsible for the outcome of the legislation. Therefore this paper should be seen as a first attempt to apply the framework of public choice theory to the field of health care financing and to demonstrate that much more research is needed.</p>","PeriodicalId":79866,"journal":{"name":"Developments in health economics and public policy","volume":"1 ","pages":"267-85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Developments in health economics and public policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6

Abstract

In this paper we tried to explain the recent reform in the law of financing German hospitals. We first described five basic types of hospital payment systems which were available as alternatives to the decision on the reform in the early 1980s. In the next step we identified five concerned interest groups whose actions certainly had a great influence on the legislative process. We proposed a simple theoretical model to examine how these groups of actors evaluated the different payment systems. After deriving a preference ranking for each actor, we confronted these rankings with the respective revealed preferences, which could be inferred from their official statements towards the reform. It could also be shown that quite often the actual statements deviated strongly from the theoretically expected preferences because all groups were engaged in a highly interactive lobbying game. In the last step we compared these preferences to the actual outcome of the legislation and found that all groups have at least partly realized their targets. So in contrast to the typical results of interest group theory, the differences in bargaining power do to appear to have led to a solution which unambiguously benefits some groups of actors at the expense of others. It has to be repeated that the empirical analysis was limited to statements from the interest groups in the pre-legislative stage of the whole process. From this point the most promising procedure would appear to be the step-by-step analysis of the statements of the groups during the legislative process as well. This would give the researcher a chance to evaluate whether or not the theoretical hypotheses can be confirmed, whether or not our simple theoretical model is an appropriate way to understand the behavior of the affected groups and what was finally responsible for the outcome of the legislation. Therefore this paper should be seen as a first attempt to apply the framework of public choice theory to the field of health care financing and to demonstrate that much more research is needed.

医院融资的政治经济学。
在本文中,我们试图解释最近改革的法律资助德国医院。我们首先描述了五种基本类型的医院支付系统,这些系统可作为20世纪80年代初改革决定的替代方案。下一步,我们确定了五个相关的利益集团,他们的行动肯定会对立法进程产生重大影响。我们提出了一个简单的理论模型来研究这些参与者群体如何评估不同的支付系统。在得出每个参与者的偏好排名后,我们将这些排名与各自透露的偏好进行比较,这些偏好可以从他们对改革的官方声明中推断出来。还可以证明,实际陈述往往与理论上预期的偏好严重偏离,因为所有群体都参与了一场高度互动的游说游戏。在最后一步中,我们将这些偏好与立法的实际结果进行了比较,发现所有群体至少部分实现了他们的目标。因此,与利益集团理论的典型结果相反,议价能力的差异似乎确实导致了一种解决方案,这种解决方案明确地以牺牲其他行为者群体为代价,使某些群体受益。必须重申的是,经验分析仅限于整个过程立法前阶段各利益集团的发言。从这一点来看,最有希望的程序似乎是在立法过程中逐步分析各集团的声明。这将使研究人员有机会评估理论假设是否可以被证实,我们的简单理论模型是否适合理解受影响群体的行为以及最终导致立法结果的因素。因此,本文应被视为将公共选择理论框架应用于医疗融资领域的第一次尝试,并表明需要进行更多的研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信