Extending detection engineering to digital forensics: The Velociraptor unified detection-forensics methodology

IF 3.1 4区 医学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Aghni Anugrah Raesa, Adithyan Shaji Nambiar, Veda Dawoonauth, Aditya Kumar, Mike Cohen, Priyanka Singh
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Detection engineering monitors live endpoint logs through centralised platforms. Digital forensics reconstructs past activity from durable artefacts such as Prefetch files and command history. These two disciplines work in parallel. Detection rules depend on log streams that attackers can clear, while forensic analysis remains largely manual.
This paper presents a unified methodology that treats forensic artefacts as structured log sources for Sigma detection rules. Detection logic initiates targeted evidence acquisition so that every alert carries the forensic artefacts that support it. A four-stage process converts artefact knowledge into reusable detection rules. Correlation rules link related detections using native timestamps where the artefact records them and positional ordering where it does not.
Two case studies demonstrate the approach. The first detects bursts of network discovery activity (MITRE ATT&CK T1016) in Windows Prefetch, a forensic fallback when event logs are unavailable. The second detects a four-step infection chain in Linux bash history, where no timestamps exist. Both operate on artefacts that persist after log tampering, and each rule is authored once and then reused across endpoints.
将检测工程扩展到数字取证:迅猛龙统一检测取证方法
检测工程通过集中平台监控实时端点日志。数字取证从持久的工件(如预取文件和命令历史)重建过去的活动。这两门学科是并行的。检测规则依赖于攻击者可以清除的日志流,而取证分析在很大程度上仍然是手动的。本文提出了一种统一的方法,将法医人工制品作为Sigma检测规则的结构化日志源。检测逻辑启动有针对性的证据采集,以便每个警报都带有支持它的取证人工制品。一个四阶段的过程将工件知识转换为可重用的检测规则。相关规则使用本机时间戳(工件记录它们的地方)和位置排序(工件不记录它们的地方)链接相关检测。两个案例研究演示了这种方法。第一个是在Windows Prefetch中检测网络发现活动(MITRE att&ck T1016)的爆发,这是在事件日志不可用时的取证回退。第二种方法检测Linux bash历史记录中的四步感染链,其中不存在时间戳。两者都对日志篡改后仍然存在的工件进行操作,并且每个规则只编写一次,然后跨端点重用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.90
自引率
15.00%
发文量
87
审稿时长
76 days
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