Unwinding Loan Prospecting Pressure through Renegotiation: The Role of Loan Officer Changes in Debt Contracting

The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2026-10-01 DOI:10.2308/tar-2025-0120

Jessie Cheong,Jung Koo Kang,Regina Wittenberg-Moerman

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Abstract

ABSTRACT We examine the impact of loan officer changes on debt contract design. Loan officers face pressure to originate new loans, incentivizing them to offer loan terms that are more favorable than warranted by borrowers’ creditworthiness. Because a loan officer who replaces the originating loan officer is not subject to this loan prospecting pressure, we predict that she reverses the favorable discretion exercised at loan origination. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the first renegotiation following the replacement of the originating loan officer is associated with more unfavorable renegotiation outcomes. This effect is more pronounced when loan prospecting pressure at loan origination is greater—when the originating loan officer is less experienced, when the lead arranger faces tight performance benchmarks or lower income growth, and when credit market competition is more intense. Overall, we provide novel insights into how loan officer changes restore contracting efficiency through renegotiations. Data Availability: Syndicated loan data are from DealScan; borrower financial data are from Compustat and CRSP; bank financial data are from the Call Report and Compustat; loan agreements are from Morningstar, FactSet, and SEC filings; analyst data are from I/B/E/S; credit rating data are from S&P Global Ratings and the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD); media coverage data are from RavenPack; covenant violation data are from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012); and loan officer employment histories were hand collected from LinkedIn. JEL Classifications: G21; G30; G32; J24.

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通过重新谈判解除贷款前景压力：信贷员在债务合同中的角色变化

我们研究了信贷员变动对债务合同设计的影响。信贷员面临着发放新贷款的压力，这促使他们提供比借款人信誉更有利的贷款条件。因为取代原始贷款人员的信贷员不受这种贷款前景压力的影响，我们预测她会逆转贷款发放时的有利自由裁量权。与这一预测相一致的是，我们发现，更换原信贷员后的第一次重新谈判与更不利的重新谈判结果相关。当贷款发放时的贷款前景压力较大时，当发放贷款的信贷员经验不足时，当主要安排人面临严格的绩效基准或较低的收入增长时，当信贷市场竞争更加激烈时，这种影响更为明显。总的来说，我们提供了新的见解，如何贷款官员的变化恢复合同效率通过重新谈判。数据可用性：银团贷款数据来自DealScan；借款人的财务数据来自Compustat和CRSP；银行财务数据来自Call Report和Compustat；贷款协议来自晨星、FactSet和SEC的文件；分析师数据来自I/B/E/S；信用评级数据来自标普全球评级和合并固定收益证券数据库（FISD）；媒体报道数据来自RavenPack；契约违约数据来自Nini， Smith, and Sufi (2012)；和信贷员的就业历史都是从领英上手工收集的。JEL分类：G21；G30;G32;J24。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Accounting Review

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