{"title":"Optimal contract modes based on BIM capability maturity: the case of design and construction contracts","authors":"Ting Wang","doi":"10.1007/s10999-026-09975-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Building Information Modeling (BIM) has transformed project delivery, yet contract design for BIM-enabled projects remains anchored in qualitative frameworks that implicitly assume uniform BIM capability across contracting parties. In practice, however, the designer and constructor often operate at substantially different levels of BIM capability maturity (BIM-CM), creating heterogeneous information environments that standard principal-agent models do not address. This study develops a normative analytical framework that treats BIM-CM as the central determinant of contract architecture. We construct a dual-agent principal-agent model in which the designer and constructor contribute complementary efforts through a collaborative production function, and we solve for optimal contract modes under three BIM-CM configurations: both parties at high maturity, both at low maturity, and–most distinctively–mixed maturity, where one party is mature and the other is not. Nine propositions are derived, and second-order conditions are verified to establish equilibrium uniqueness. The results yield three contract prescriptions. Under high BIM-CM, a compulsory (fixed-price) contract achieves the first-best: the risk-neutral owner bears all output risk. Under low BIM-CM, an incentive contract with risk-sharing is optimal. The mixed-maturity configuration produces a hybrid compulsory-plus-incentive contract absent from standard theory. A novel free-riding mechanism (Fig. 3) is identified: the high-maturity party’s observable effort, transmitted through the collaborative production function, raises the low-maturity party’s remuneration while depressing its own effort, such that the first-best remains unattainable even with one fully mature partner. Agency costs are decomposed into risk and incentive components and compared across configurations. The paper contributes a maturity-contingent contract typology and a decision heuristic that translate formal results into actionable guidance, replacing uniform qualitative prescriptions with differentiated contract recommendations grounded in BIM capability assessment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":593,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design","volume":"22 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.7000,"publicationDate":"2026-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design","FirstCategoryId":"88","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10999-026-09975-5","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"材料科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Building Information Modeling (BIM) has transformed project delivery, yet contract design for BIM-enabled projects remains anchored in qualitative frameworks that implicitly assume uniform BIM capability across contracting parties. In practice, however, the designer and constructor often operate at substantially different levels of BIM capability maturity (BIM-CM), creating heterogeneous information environments that standard principal-agent models do not address. This study develops a normative analytical framework that treats BIM-CM as the central determinant of contract architecture. We construct a dual-agent principal-agent model in which the designer and constructor contribute complementary efforts through a collaborative production function, and we solve for optimal contract modes under three BIM-CM configurations: both parties at high maturity, both at low maturity, and–most distinctively–mixed maturity, where one party is mature and the other is not. Nine propositions are derived, and second-order conditions are verified to establish equilibrium uniqueness. The results yield three contract prescriptions. Under high BIM-CM, a compulsory (fixed-price) contract achieves the first-best: the risk-neutral owner bears all output risk. Under low BIM-CM, an incentive contract with risk-sharing is optimal. The mixed-maturity configuration produces a hybrid compulsory-plus-incentive contract absent from standard theory. A novel free-riding mechanism (Fig. 3) is identified: the high-maturity party’s observable effort, transmitted through the collaborative production function, raises the low-maturity party’s remuneration while depressing its own effort, such that the first-best remains unattainable even with one fully mature partner. Agency costs are decomposed into risk and incentive components and compared across configurations. The paper contributes a maturity-contingent contract typology and a decision heuristic that translate formal results into actionable guidance, replacing uniform qualitative prescriptions with differentiated contract recommendations grounded in BIM capability assessment.
期刊介绍:
It is the objective of this journal to provide an effective medium for the dissemination of recent advances and original works in mechanics and materials'' engineering and their impact on the design process in an integrated, highly focused and coherent format. The goal is to enable mechanical, aeronautical, civil, automotive, biomedical, chemical and nuclear engineers, researchers and scientists to keep abreast of recent developments and exchange ideas on a number of topics relating to the use of mechanics and materials in design.
Analytical synopsis of contents:
The following non-exhaustive list is considered to be within the scope of the International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design:
Intelligent Design:
Nano-engineering and Nano-science in Design;
Smart Materials and Adaptive Structures in Design;
Mechanism(s) Design;
Design against Failure;
Design for Manufacturing;
Design of Ultralight Structures;
Design for a Clean Environment;
Impact and Crashworthiness;
Microelectronic Packaging Systems.
Advanced Materials in Design:
Newly Engineered Materials;
Smart Materials and Adaptive Structures;
Micromechanical Modelling of Composites;
Damage Characterisation of Advanced/Traditional Materials;
Alternative Use of Traditional Materials in Design;
Functionally Graded Materials;
Failure Analysis: Fatigue and Fracture;
Multiscale Modelling Concepts and Methodology;
Interfaces, interfacial properties and characterisation.
Design Analysis and Optimisation:
Shape and Topology Optimisation;
Structural Optimisation;
Optimisation Algorithms in Design;
Nonlinear Mechanics in Design;
Novel Numerical Tools in Design;
Geometric Modelling and CAD Tools in Design;
FEM, BEM and Hybrid Methods;
Integrated Computer Aided Design;
Computational Failure Analysis;
Coupled Thermo-Electro-Mechanical Designs.