Optimal contract modes based on BIM capability maturity: the case of design and construction contracts

IF 4.7 3区 材料科学 Q2 ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL
Ting Wang
{"title":"Optimal contract modes based on BIM capability maturity: the case of design and construction contracts","authors":"Ting Wang","doi":"10.1007/s10999-026-09975-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Building Information Modeling (BIM) has transformed project delivery, yet contract design for BIM-enabled projects remains anchored in qualitative frameworks that implicitly assume uniform BIM capability across contracting parties. In practice, however, the designer and constructor often operate at substantially different levels of BIM capability maturity (BIM-CM), creating heterogeneous information environments that standard principal-agent models do not address. This study develops a normative analytical framework that treats BIM-CM as the central determinant of contract architecture. We construct a dual-agent principal-agent model in which the designer and constructor contribute complementary efforts through a collaborative production function, and we solve for optimal contract modes under three BIM-CM configurations: both parties at high maturity, both at low maturity, and–most distinctively–mixed maturity, where one party is mature and the other is not. Nine propositions are derived, and second-order conditions are verified to establish equilibrium uniqueness. The results yield three contract prescriptions. Under high BIM-CM, a compulsory (fixed-price) contract achieves the first-best: the risk-neutral owner bears all output risk. Under low BIM-CM, an incentive contract with risk-sharing is optimal. The mixed-maturity configuration produces a hybrid compulsory-plus-incentive contract absent from standard theory. A novel free-riding mechanism (Fig. 3) is identified: the high-maturity party’s observable effort, transmitted through the collaborative production function, raises the low-maturity party’s remuneration while depressing its own effort, such that the first-best remains unattainable even with one fully mature partner. Agency costs are decomposed into risk and incentive components and compared across configurations. The paper contributes a maturity-contingent contract typology and a decision heuristic that translate formal results into actionable guidance, replacing uniform qualitative prescriptions with differentiated contract recommendations grounded in BIM capability assessment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":593,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design","volume":"22 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.7000,"publicationDate":"2026-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design","FirstCategoryId":"88","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10999-026-09975-5","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"材料科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Building Information Modeling (BIM) has transformed project delivery, yet contract design for BIM-enabled projects remains anchored in qualitative frameworks that implicitly assume uniform BIM capability across contracting parties. In practice, however, the designer and constructor often operate at substantially different levels of BIM capability maturity (BIM-CM), creating heterogeneous information environments that standard principal-agent models do not address. This study develops a normative analytical framework that treats BIM-CM as the central determinant of contract architecture. We construct a dual-agent principal-agent model in which the designer and constructor contribute complementary efforts through a collaborative production function, and we solve for optimal contract modes under three BIM-CM configurations: both parties at high maturity, both at low maturity, and–most distinctively–mixed maturity, where one party is mature and the other is not. Nine propositions are derived, and second-order conditions are verified to establish equilibrium uniqueness. The results yield three contract prescriptions. Under high BIM-CM, a compulsory (fixed-price) contract achieves the first-best: the risk-neutral owner bears all output risk. Under low BIM-CM, an incentive contract with risk-sharing is optimal. The mixed-maturity configuration produces a hybrid compulsory-plus-incentive contract absent from standard theory. A novel free-riding mechanism (Fig. 3) is identified: the high-maturity party’s observable effort, transmitted through the collaborative production function, raises the low-maturity party’s remuneration while depressing its own effort, such that the first-best remains unattainable even with one fully mature partner. Agency costs are decomposed into risk and incentive components and compared across configurations. The paper contributes a maturity-contingent contract typology and a decision heuristic that translate formal results into actionable guidance, replacing uniform qualitative prescriptions with differentiated contract recommendations grounded in BIM capability assessment.

基于BIM能力成熟度的最优合同模式:以设计与施工合同为例
建筑信息模型(BIM)已经改变了项目交付,然而BIM支持的项目的合同设计仍然锚定在定性框架中,这些框架隐含地假设了缔约各方统一的BIM能力。然而,在实践中,设计师和建造者经常在BIM能力成熟度(BIM- cm)的不同层次上运作,创造了标准委托-代理模型无法解决的异构信息环境。本研究开发了一个规范性分析框架,将BIM-CM视为契约架构的核心决定因素。我们构建了一个双代理的委托代理模型,其中设计者和建设者通过协同生产函数贡献互补的努力,我们求解了三种BIM-CM配置下的最优契约模式:双方都处于高成熟度,双方都处于低成熟度,最明显的是混合成熟度,其中一方成熟而另一方不成熟。导出了九个命题,并验证了建立均衡唯一性的二阶条件。结果得出三种合同处方。在高BIM-CM条件下,强制性(固定价格)合同达到了最优:风险中性的所有者承担全部产出风险。在BIM-CM较低的情况下,风险分担的激励契约是最优的。混合期限配置产生了标准理论所没有的强制加激励的混合契约。发现了一种新的搭便车机制(图3):高成熟方的可观察努力通过协同生产函数传递,提高了低成熟方的报酬,同时抑制了其自身的努力,以至于即使有一个完全成熟的合作伙伴,也无法达到第一最佳。将代理成本分解为风险和激励两部分,并在不同配置下进行比较。本文提供了一个基于成熟度的合同类型学和一个决策启发式,将正式结果转化为可操作的指导,用基于BIM能力评估的差异化合同建议取代统一的定性处方。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design
International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL-MATERIALS SCIENCE, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
5.40%
发文量
41
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: It is the objective of this journal to provide an effective medium for the dissemination of recent advances and original works in mechanics and materials'' engineering and their impact on the design process in an integrated, highly focused and coherent format. The goal is to enable mechanical, aeronautical, civil, automotive, biomedical, chemical and nuclear engineers, researchers and scientists to keep abreast of recent developments and exchange ideas on a number of topics relating to the use of mechanics and materials in design. Analytical synopsis of contents: The following non-exhaustive list is considered to be within the scope of the International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in Design: Intelligent Design: Nano-engineering and Nano-science in Design; Smart Materials and Adaptive Structures in Design; Mechanism(s) Design; Design against Failure; Design for Manufacturing; Design of Ultralight Structures; Design for a Clean Environment; Impact and Crashworthiness; Microelectronic Packaging Systems. Advanced Materials in Design: Newly Engineered Materials; Smart Materials and Adaptive Structures; Micromechanical Modelling of Composites; Damage Characterisation of Advanced/Traditional Materials; Alternative Use of Traditional Materials in Design; Functionally Graded Materials; Failure Analysis: Fatigue and Fracture; Multiscale Modelling Concepts and Methodology; Interfaces, interfacial properties and characterisation. Design Analysis and Optimisation: Shape and Topology Optimisation; Structural Optimisation; Optimisation Algorithms in Design; Nonlinear Mechanics in Design; Novel Numerical Tools in Design; Geometric Modelling and CAD Tools in Design; FEM, BEM and Hybrid Methods; Integrated Computer Aided Design; Computational Failure Analysis; Coupled Thermo-Electro-Mechanical Designs.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书