Token-Guided Flow Tracing for Auditable Zero-Knowledge Smart Contract Transfers

IF 2 4区 计算机科学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Junhee Lee, Jihye Kim, Hyunok Oh, Heejin Park
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Private transfers on public smart contract blockchains hide transaction values and private transfer links, but accountable privacy requires controlled auditability. Existing auditable zero-knowledge transfer systems make per-transaction audit information available to an authorized auditor, but their audit model may allow the auditor to inspect transactions beyond the flow connected to the authorized audit target. In such a model, granting audit capability for one investigation can expose unrelated transactions or allow tracing to continue farther than intended. In this paper, we propose token-guided flow tracing for auditable zero-knowledge smart contract transfers, enabling audit authorization to be scoped to a transaction flow and epoch range. The construction separates audit authorization from audit capability by introducing a tracing-token manager and an auditor. The auditor can open audit information only when it holds the auditor secret key, an epoch secret key for an authorized epoch, and a tracing token associated with the target transaction flow. Direction-specific tracing tokens confine tracing to the authorized direction, while epoch public keys and a binary key-derivation tree support compact authorization of audit intervals. We analyze security through ledger indistinguishability, transaction nonmalleability, balance, audit correctness, and restricted audit authorization. Restricted audit authorization is established in an honest authorization model that assumes the tracing-token manager and the auditor do not collude beyond explicit audit authorizations; under these assumptions, the auditor cannot open or trace transactions outside the authorized flow, direction, and epoch scope. Our implementation adds 16,349 transfer-circuit constraints, about 178,000 gas to each accepted transfer, and 448 bytes to the serialized transfer transaction, showing that scoped auditability can be added with moderate on-chain overhead.

可审计的零知识智能合约传输的令牌引导流跟踪
公共智能合约区块链上的私人转移隐藏了交易价值和私人转移链接,但负责任的隐私需要受控的可审计性。现有的可审计的零知识传输系统使每个事务的审计信息可供授权的审计人员使用,但是它们的审计模型可能允许审计人员检查连接到授权审计目标的流之外的事务。在这样的模型中,为一项调查授予审计功能可能会暴露不相关的事务,或者允许跟踪继续进行得比预期的更远。在本文中,我们为可审计的零知识智能合约传输提出了令牌引导的流程跟踪,使审计授权能够限定在事务流和epoch范围内。该构造通过引入跟踪令牌管理器和审计员将审计授权与审计功能分开。只有当审计员持有审计员秘钥、授权epoch的epoch秘钥以及与目标事务流关联的跟踪令牌时,审计员才能打开审计信息。特定于方向的跟踪令牌将跟踪限制在授权的方向上,而epoch公钥和二进制密钥派生树支持审计间隔的紧凑授权。我们通过分类账不可区分性、交易不可延展性、平衡性、审计正确性和限制审计授权来分析安全性。限制审计授权是在诚实授权模型中建立的,该模型假设跟踪令牌管理器和审计员不会在显式审计授权之外串通;在这些假设下,审计员不能打开或跟踪授权流、方向和时间范围之外的事务。我们的实现增加了16,349个传输电路约束,每个接受的传输增加了大约178,000个gas,序列化的传输事务增加了448个字节,这表明可以在适度的链上开销的情况下增加范围内的可审计性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
IET Information Security
IET Information Security 工程技术-计算机:理论方法
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
7.10%
发文量
47
审稿时长
8.6 months
期刊介绍: IET Information Security publishes original research papers in the following areas of information security and cryptography. Submitting authors should specify clearly in their covering statement the area into which their paper falls. Scope: Access Control and Database Security Ad-Hoc Network Aspects Anonymity and E-Voting Authentication Block Ciphers and Hash Functions Blockchain, Bitcoin (Technical aspects only) Broadcast Encryption and Traitor Tracing Combinatorial Aspects Covert Channels and Information Flow Critical Infrastructures Cryptanalysis Dependability Digital Rights Management Digital Signature Schemes Digital Steganography Economic Aspects of Information Security Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Number Theory Embedded Systems Aspects Embedded Systems Security and Forensics Financial Cryptography Firewall Security Formal Methods and Security Verification Human Aspects Information Warfare and Survivability Intrusion Detection Java and XML Security Key Distribution Key Management Malware Multi-Party Computation and Threshold Cryptography Peer-to-peer Security PKIs Public-Key and Hybrid Encryption Quantum Cryptography Risks of using Computers Robust Networks Secret Sharing Secure Electronic Commerce Software Obfuscation Stream Ciphers Trust Models Watermarking and Fingerprinting Special Issues. Current Call for Papers: Security on Mobile and IoT devices - https://digital-library.theiet.org/files/IET_IFS_SMID_CFP.pdf
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