{"title":"Market expansion and litigation deterrence effects of patents: Evidence from Chinese exporters","authors":"Xinghua Deng, Ran Jing, John Ries","doi":"10.1111/caje.70068","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>China's overseas patents grew rapidly in the past two decades at the same time as China became the world's largest exporter of merchandise goods. This paper investigates the effects of overseas patents on the volume and prices of Chinese firms' exports. We consider two channels. First, patents prevent imitation and rival entry, leading to higher quantities and prices. Second, patents reduce the likelihood of litigation and can allow firms to price more aggressively if they are keeping prices high to deter potential litigation in the export market. We find evidence of both. Both channels predict a higher quantity of exports, and we find evidence of that in the data. We also compile evidence consistent with patents allowing Chinese firms to price more aggressively (lower prices).</p>","PeriodicalId":47941,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","volume":"59 2","pages":"480-509"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2026-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/caje.70068","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/caje.70068","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/6/29 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
China's overseas patents grew rapidly in the past two decades at the same time as China became the world's largest exporter of merchandise goods. This paper investigates the effects of overseas patents on the volume and prices of Chinese firms' exports. We consider two channels. First, patents prevent imitation and rival entry, leading to higher quantities and prices. Second, patents reduce the likelihood of litigation and can allow firms to price more aggressively if they are keeping prices high to deter potential litigation in the export market. We find evidence of both. Both channels predict a higher quantity of exports, and we find evidence of that in the data. We also compile evidence consistent with patents allowing Chinese firms to price more aggressively (lower prices).
期刊介绍:
The Canadian Journal of Economics (CJE) is the journal of the Canadian Economics Association (CEA) and is the primary academic economics journal based in Canada. The editors seek to maintain and enhance the position of the CJE as a major, internationally recognized journal and are very receptive to high-quality papers on any economics topic from any source. In addition, the editors recognize the Journal"s role as an important outlet for high-quality empirical papers about the Canadian economy and about Canadian policy issues.