Muhammad Shaharyar Yaqub, Wooyeon Jo, Tamer Nadeem, Erdem Topsakal, Irfan Ahmed
{"title":"Digital forensic readiness of regulated medical devices: An empirical study of the GE venue ultrasound system","authors":"Muhammad Shaharyar Yaqub, Wooyeon Jo, Tamer Nadeem, Erdem Topsakal, Irfan Ahmed","doi":"10.1016/j.fsidi.2026.302121","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Medical devices increasingly operate as networked computing platforms, yet incident response remains difficult because many regulated systems restrict logging, execution, and evidence collection. Point-of-care ultrasound (POCUS) devices are especially challenging: they are workflow-driven, safety-adjacent, and often run embedded, vendor-managed Windows stacks that handle patient-associated data while limiting investigator access. This paper, to our knowledge, presents the first end-to-end forensic readiness and physical-memory forensics study of a POCUS ultrasound platform, using the GE Venue Ultrasound system as a case study.</div><div>We introduce URSA, a volatile-first readiness workflow for constrained ultrasound devices, and operationalize it with a UI-state-driven acquisition design that ties memory collection to observable clinical modes. Across seven full physical memory dumps captured before and after controlled scan-and-review interactions, we demonstrate repeatable acquisition under segmented storage and restrictive execution boundaries. Memory analysis reconstructs the clinical launch chain and yields both security-relevant artifacts and clinical exposure artifacts, including structured patient-associated logs and renderable diagnostic images recovered from RAM, with persistence characterized across states and time offsets. We complement volatile results with targeted disk-side context to quantify permission boundaries and corroborate selected findings. These findings provide practical guidance for improving forensic readiness and privacy-aware response on regulated ultrasound platforms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48481,"journal":{"name":"Forensic Science International-Digital Investigation","volume":"57 ","pages":"Article 302121"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Forensic Science International-Digital Investigation","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666281726000788","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/7/22 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Medical devices increasingly operate as networked computing platforms, yet incident response remains difficult because many regulated systems restrict logging, execution, and evidence collection. Point-of-care ultrasound (POCUS) devices are especially challenging: they are workflow-driven, safety-adjacent, and often run embedded, vendor-managed Windows stacks that handle patient-associated data while limiting investigator access. This paper, to our knowledge, presents the first end-to-end forensic readiness and physical-memory forensics study of a POCUS ultrasound platform, using the GE Venue Ultrasound system as a case study.
We introduce URSA, a volatile-first readiness workflow for constrained ultrasound devices, and operationalize it with a UI-state-driven acquisition design that ties memory collection to observable clinical modes. Across seven full physical memory dumps captured before and after controlled scan-and-review interactions, we demonstrate repeatable acquisition under segmented storage and restrictive execution boundaries. Memory analysis reconstructs the clinical launch chain and yields both security-relevant artifacts and clinical exposure artifacts, including structured patient-associated logs and renderable diagnostic images recovered from RAM, with persistence characterized across states and time offsets. We complement volatile results with targeted disk-side context to quantify permission boundaries and corroborate selected findings. These findings provide practical guidance for improving forensic readiness and privacy-aware response on regulated ultrasound platforms.