Samaneh Yazdanipour;Mohammadreza Fakhari Moghaddam Arani;Amir Abiri Jahromi;V. S. R. Varaprasad Oruganti;Sheldon S. Williamson
{"title":"Protecting Local Wireless Charging Stations Against Cyber-Physical Attacks by Weaponized EVs","authors":"Samaneh Yazdanipour;Mohammadreza Fakhari Moghaddam Arani;Amir Abiri Jahromi;V. S. R. Varaprasad Oruganti;Sheldon S. Williamson","doi":"10.1109/OAJPE.2026.3701304","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Wireless charging stations are gaining attention due to their ability to reduce the weight and size of the battery in the electric vehicles and increase the battery life time. Wireless charging stations are also an attractive technology for autonomous vehicle charging as they do not need human intervention. Although the design of wireless charging stations has been investigated thoroughly, the cyber-physical security posture of wireless charging stations has remained underexplored. In this paper, we examine the vulnerability of wireless charging stations to cyber-physical attacks by weaponized electric vehicles. In this paper, a weaponized EV is defined as a vehicle intentionally modified with a rogue device connected to its internal communication network capable of injecting falsified information into the electric vehicle communication controller, point-to-point communication channels, and the battery management system. Small-signal modelling is used to study the dynamics of cyber-physical systems in wireless charging, while phasor circuit analysis is used to evaluate the impact of cyber-physical attacks on wireless charging stations. A mitigation strategy is further proposed to improve the resilience of the wireless charging stations to cyber-physical attacks. Time domain simulations are employed to test and verify the analyses and the proposed mitigation strategy.","PeriodicalId":56187,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Open Access Journal of Power and Energy","volume":"13 ","pages":"470-483"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=11557497","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Open Access Journal of Power and Energy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11557497/","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/6/10 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ENERGY & FUELS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Wireless charging stations are gaining attention due to their ability to reduce the weight and size of the battery in the electric vehicles and increase the battery life time. Wireless charging stations are also an attractive technology for autonomous vehicle charging as they do not need human intervention. Although the design of wireless charging stations has been investigated thoroughly, the cyber-physical security posture of wireless charging stations has remained underexplored. In this paper, we examine the vulnerability of wireless charging stations to cyber-physical attacks by weaponized electric vehicles. In this paper, a weaponized EV is defined as a vehicle intentionally modified with a rogue device connected to its internal communication network capable of injecting falsified information into the electric vehicle communication controller, point-to-point communication channels, and the battery management system. Small-signal modelling is used to study the dynamics of cyber-physical systems in wireless charging, while phasor circuit analysis is used to evaluate the impact of cyber-physical attacks on wireless charging stations. A mitigation strategy is further proposed to improve the resilience of the wireless charging stations to cyber-physical attacks. Time domain simulations are employed to test and verify the analyses and the proposed mitigation strategy.