{"title":"Anchoring the cluster: refining Pigliucci's family resemblance proposal via a dual constraint model of moderate scientific realism.","authors":"Yiyi Yang","doi":"10.1007/s40656-026-00737-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Massimo Pigliucci attempts to solve the species problem by integrating Wittgenstein's family resemblance into a scientific realist stance. He proposes that species are interest-independent natural clusters, yet he simultaneously concedes to the purpose-driven pluralism found in biological practice. We argue that this proposal leaves a central tension: it lacks a normative account to explain how an interest-independent ontology coexists with pluralistic practice. Although Pigliucci attempts to defend this realist commitment by appealing to the efficacy of scientific practice, we contend that his defense is problematic. Specifically, his defense exhibits three flaws: first, the inference from practical convergence to strong scientific realism is insufficient; second, it creates an explanatory tension regarding the coexistence of convergence and divergence; and third, it fails to rule out a more parsimonious institutional explanation. In response, we propose a practice-based moderate scientific realism. Decoupling reality from interest-independence, we formulate this realism as a dual constraint model: the reality of species is anchored in the world's causal constraints, while the objectivity of classification is maintained through the community's normative constraints. By substituting strong scientific realism with moderate scientific realism, this approach refines Pigliucci's family resemblance proposal, offering a coherent solution to the species problem that reconciles realist commitments with pluralistic practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"48 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2026-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-026-00737-2","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Massimo Pigliucci attempts to solve the species problem by integrating Wittgenstein's family resemblance into a scientific realist stance. He proposes that species are interest-independent natural clusters, yet he simultaneously concedes to the purpose-driven pluralism found in biological practice. We argue that this proposal leaves a central tension: it lacks a normative account to explain how an interest-independent ontology coexists with pluralistic practice. Although Pigliucci attempts to defend this realist commitment by appealing to the efficacy of scientific practice, we contend that his defense is problematic. Specifically, his defense exhibits three flaws: first, the inference from practical convergence to strong scientific realism is insufficient; second, it creates an explanatory tension regarding the coexistence of convergence and divergence; and third, it fails to rule out a more parsimonious institutional explanation. In response, we propose a practice-based moderate scientific realism. Decoupling reality from interest-independence, we formulate this realism as a dual constraint model: the reality of species is anchored in the world's causal constraints, while the objectivity of classification is maintained through the community's normative constraints. By substituting strong scientific realism with moderate scientific realism, this approach refines Pigliucci's family resemblance proposal, offering a coherent solution to the species problem that reconciles realist commitments with pluralistic practice.
期刊介绍:
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences is an interdisciplinary journal committed to providing an integrative approach to understanding the life sciences. It welcomes submissions from historians, philosophers, biologists, physicians, ethicists and scholars in the social studies of science. Contributors are expected to offer broad and interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of biology, biomedicine and related fields, especially as these perspectives illuminate the foundations, development, and/or implications of scientific practices and related developments. Submissions which are collaborative and feature different disciplinary approaches are especially encouraged, as are submissions written by senior and junior scholars (including graduate students).