Anchoring the cluster: refining Pigliucci's family resemblance proposal via a dual constraint model of moderate scientific realism.

IF 1 3区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Yiyi Yang
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Abstract

Massimo Pigliucci attempts to solve the species problem by integrating Wittgenstein's family resemblance into a scientific realist stance. He proposes that species are interest-independent natural clusters, yet he simultaneously concedes to the purpose-driven pluralism found in biological practice. We argue that this proposal leaves a central tension: it lacks a normative account to explain how an interest-independent ontology coexists with pluralistic practice. Although Pigliucci attempts to defend this realist commitment by appealing to the efficacy of scientific practice, we contend that his defense is problematic. Specifically, his defense exhibits three flaws: first, the inference from practical convergence to strong scientific realism is insufficient; second, it creates an explanatory tension regarding the coexistence of convergence and divergence; and third, it fails to rule out a more parsimonious institutional explanation. In response, we propose a practice-based moderate scientific realism. Decoupling reality from interest-independence, we formulate this realism as a dual constraint model: the reality of species is anchored in the world's causal constraints, while the objectivity of classification is maintained through the community's normative constraints. By substituting strong scientific realism with moderate scientific realism, this approach refines Pigliucci's family resemblance proposal, offering a coherent solution to the species problem that reconciles realist commitments with pluralistic practice.

锚定集群:通过适度科学实在论的双重约束模型完善Pigliucci的家族相似性建议。
马西莫·皮留奇试图通过将维特根斯坦的家族相似性与科学现实主义立场相结合来解决物种问题。他提出物种是利益独立的自然集群,但他同时承认在生物实践中发现的目的驱动的多元主义。我们认为,这一提议留下了一个中心张力:它缺乏一个规范的解释,以解释一个利益独立的本体论如何与多元化的实践共存。尽管皮柳奇试图通过诉诸科学实践的有效性来捍卫这种现实主义的承诺,但我们认为他的辩护是有问题的。具体而言,他的辩护存在三个缺陷:第一,从实践趋同到强科学实在论的推论不足;其次,它创造了一种关于趋同与分化共存的解释性张力;第三,它未能排除一种更为简洁的制度解释。对此,我们提出了一种基于实践的适度科学实在论。将现实与利益独立性分离,我们将这种现实主义表述为双重约束模型:物种的现实根植于世界的因果约束,而分类的客观性则通过社区的规范性约束来维持。通过用温和的科学实在论代替强烈的科学实在论,这种方法完善了皮久奇的家族相似性建议,为物种问题提供了一个协调实在论承诺与多元实践的连贯解决方案。
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来源期刊
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 综合性期刊-科学史与科学哲学
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
5.00%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences is an interdisciplinary journal committed to providing an integrative approach to understanding the life sciences. It welcomes submissions from historians, philosophers, biologists, physicians, ethicists and scholars in the social studies of science. Contributors are expected to offer broad and interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of biology, biomedicine and related fields, especially as these perspectives illuminate the foundations, development, and/or implications of scientific practices and related developments. Submissions which are collaborative and feature different disciplinary approaches are especially encouraged, as are submissions written by senior and junior scholars (including graduate students).
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