{"title":"From imposter to algorithmic attribution: A theoretical model of AI-induced professional self-doubt","authors":"Amna Jamshaid , Michael Grantham","doi":"10.1016/j.chbah.2026.100326","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The entry of generative artificial intelligence (AI) into knowledge-intensive professional practice unsettles a question older than the technology itself: who is entitled to claim authorship of their own work. Drawing on attribution theory, self-efficacy theory, self-discrepancy theory, and professional identity research, this article develops a theoretical construct, AI-Induced Imposter Syndrome (AI-IIS), to describe a cognitive condition in which professional competence is misattributed to AI systems rather than consolidated into the self-concept. A three-stage process model is advanced, though each stage is offered as a hypothesis under stress rather than a finished description. The first proposed stage, algorithmic attribution confusion, captures the uncertainty that arises when professionals cannot clearly parse the human-versus-AI origin of performance outcomes. The second, interrupted mastery consolidation, specifies a mechanism by which self-efficacy fails to develop when successes are attributed externally. The third, professional identity destabilisation, concerns the erosion of authorship, agency, and intentionality as pillars of occupational selfhood. AI-IIS is differentiated from six adjacent technology-psychology constructs – technostress, automation anxiety, algorithm aversion, skill atrophy concerns, general AI anxiety, and AI-induced shame and guilt – though the boundaries remain permeable, and empirical clarification of overlap is itself part of the research agenda. Seven formal propositions are advanced with operationalisation anchors, alongside a measurement development roadmap for a proposed AI-IIS Scale (AI-ISS). Multilevel intervention pathways spanning cognitive attribution retraining, the Companion Model of human–AI collaboration, and institutional AI Declaration Frameworks are framed as testable experimental hypotheses, not solutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":100324,"journal":{"name":"Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans","volume":"8 ","pages":"Article 100326"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949882126000782","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/6/1 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The entry of generative artificial intelligence (AI) into knowledge-intensive professional practice unsettles a question older than the technology itself: who is entitled to claim authorship of their own work. Drawing on attribution theory, self-efficacy theory, self-discrepancy theory, and professional identity research, this article develops a theoretical construct, AI-Induced Imposter Syndrome (AI-IIS), to describe a cognitive condition in which professional competence is misattributed to AI systems rather than consolidated into the self-concept. A three-stage process model is advanced, though each stage is offered as a hypothesis under stress rather than a finished description. The first proposed stage, algorithmic attribution confusion, captures the uncertainty that arises when professionals cannot clearly parse the human-versus-AI origin of performance outcomes. The second, interrupted mastery consolidation, specifies a mechanism by which self-efficacy fails to develop when successes are attributed externally. The third, professional identity destabilisation, concerns the erosion of authorship, agency, and intentionality as pillars of occupational selfhood. AI-IIS is differentiated from six adjacent technology-psychology constructs – technostress, automation anxiety, algorithm aversion, skill atrophy concerns, general AI anxiety, and AI-induced shame and guilt – though the boundaries remain permeable, and empirical clarification of overlap is itself part of the research agenda. Seven formal propositions are advanced with operationalisation anchors, alongside a measurement development roadmap for a proposed AI-IIS Scale (AI-ISS). Multilevel intervention pathways spanning cognitive attribution retraining, the Companion Model of human–AI collaboration, and institutional AI Declaration Frameworks are framed as testable experimental hypotheses, not solutions.