Possible misplaced perception of moral shame in AI-use disclosure.

Abstract

The concept of a moral shame associated with the disclosure of artificial intelligence (AI) use in research, as articulated by Bao and Zeng ("AI disclosure, moral shame, and the punishment of honesty. Accountability in Research, https://doi-org/10.1080/08989621.2025.2542197) is in line with other related notions such as AI guilt, and calls for improvements in AI-use policies and guidelines. Here, I note a potentially paradoxical nature of such moral shame, which I would argue is somewhat in tension with simply being honest. From both research integrity or social epistemological perspectives, moral shame associated with AI-used could be a misconception on the part of the individual that arises from 1) a poor grasp of research integrity and/or 2) an epistemic failure to recognize AI writing assistants for what they really are. These two sources of misconception would need addressing.