Situated science and the state: rethinking the role of Scientific Administrative Organisations in India’s Disaster Governance

Abstract

India’s National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) positions Scientific Administrative Organizations (SAOs) as nodal agencies for early warning and risk assessment across a range of hazards. This paper critically examines what it means for an SAO—specifically the Geological Survey of India (GSI)—to take on this expanded mandate in the context of landslide risk and early warning systems. Drawing on insights from the LANDSLIP project, which aimed to develop a prototype Landslide Early Warning System (LEWS), the study reveals that such responsibility allocation entails not only technical upskilling but also a fundamental shift in the epistemological underpinnings guiding the institutional practices of these SAOs. We use theories of co-production (Jasanoff, 2004b) and situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988) to argue that disaster risk knowledge is not merely transferred from science to policy but actively produced through historically situated institutional arrangements. The paper shows how GSI’s transformation involves negotiating interdisciplinary relationships, grappling with methodological uncertainty, and redefining its role as a producer of actionable knowledge. The analysis reveals that the NDMP’s current framework fails to recognize the institutional work and epistemic restructuring required to operationalize early warnings. We propose a shift from static task allocations to a dynamic, networked approach to knowledge production and coordination. This reframing offers critical insights into how national science-policy infrastructures must evolve to make disaster risk reduction more contextually grounded, socially inclusive, and institutionally robust. Crucially, this paper also challenges the often-felt—but rarely articulated—tension of drafting national disaster management policies that are largely modelled on frameworks developed in and for the Global North. It argues that such transplants frequently neglect the institutional histories, epistemic cultures, and infrastructural realities of countries like India, leading to gaps between intended policy goals and the actual capacities and contexts of their implementing agencies.