Decoupled and Privacy-Preserving Key Generation in ABE Under the Minimal Disclosure Principle

IF 8.7 1区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS
Zhiqiang Zhang;Youwen Zhu;Xiaodong Yang;Xiaohui Ding;Changhee Hahn;Jian Wang;Junbeom Hur
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) enables fine-grained access control over outsourced data, but its key generation process typically requires users to disclose their complete attribute sets, introducing significant privacy risks. Existing privacy-preserving approaches—such as those based on zero-knowledge proofs or tightly coupled interactive protocols—suffer from limited scalability, high communication costs, and insufficient support for selective attribute disclosure. To address these limitations, we propose a privacy-enhancing key generation protocol guided by the principle of Minimal Disclosure, which ensures that users disclose only the minimally necessary subset of attributes required for authorization. Our protocol decouples attribute verification from key issuance: users first obtain cryptographically verifiable attribute tokens, and later issue blinded key requests over selectively chosen attributes. This design enables selective disclosure, supports reusable attribute credentials, and enhances user autonomy. To improve scalability, we introduce a lightweight batch verification mechanism that reduces computation and communication overhead for the attribute authority. We prove that our protocol achieves the binding and hiding properties under standard cryptographic assumptions, and we formally verify these guarantees in the symbolic model using the ProVerif tool. In addition, we propose two privacy metrics—Attribute Inference Gain (AIG) and Privacy Gain (PG)—alongside an entropy-based analysis to quantify resistance against attribute inference attacks. Experimental results show that our scheme effectively mitigates inference leakage while offering substantial efficiency gains compared to existing schemes.
最小披露原则下的ABE解耦和保密密钥生成
基于属性的加密(ABE)支持对外包数据进行细粒度的访问控制,但其密钥生成过程通常要求用户公开其完整的属性集,从而引入了重大的隐私风险。现有的隐私保护方法(例如基于零知识证明或紧密耦合交互协议的方法)存在可扩展性有限、通信成本高以及对选择性属性披露支持不足的问题。为了解决这些限制,我们提出了一种以最小披露原则为指导的增强隐私的密钥生成协议,该协议确保用户仅披露授权所需的最小必要属性子集。我们的协议将属性验证与密钥发布解耦:用户首先获得可加密验证的属性令牌,然后对选择性选择的属性发出盲法密钥请求。这种设计支持选择性公开,支持可重用的属性凭证,并增强用户自主权。为了提高可伸缩性,我们引入了一种轻量级的批验证机制,以减少属性权限的计算和通信开销。我们证明了我们的协议在标准密码学假设下实现了绑定和隐藏属性,并使用ProVerif工具在符号模型中正式验证了这些保证。此外,我们提出了两个隐私指标-属性推理增益(AIG)和隐私增益(PG) -以及基于熵的分析来量化对属性推理攻击的抵抗力。实验结果表明,与现有方案相比,我们的方案有效地减轻了推理泄漏,同时提供了可观的效率提升。
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
7.40%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6.5 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features
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