Zhiqiang Zhang;Youwen Zhu;Xiaodong Yang;Xiaohui Ding;Changhee Hahn;Jian Wang;Junbeom Hur
{"title":"Decoupled and Privacy-Preserving Key Generation in ABE Under the Minimal Disclosure Principle","authors":"Zhiqiang Zhang;Youwen Zhu;Xiaodong Yang;Xiaohui Ding;Changhee Hahn;Jian Wang;Junbeom Hur","doi":"10.1109/TIFS.2026.3666910","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) enables fine-grained access control over outsourced data, but its key generation process typically requires users to disclose their complete attribute sets, introducing significant privacy risks. Existing privacy-preserving approaches—such as those based on zero-knowledge proofs or tightly coupled interactive protocols—suffer from limited scalability, high communication costs, and insufficient support for selective attribute disclosure. To address these limitations, we propose a privacy-enhancing key generation protocol guided by the principle of Minimal Disclosure, which ensures that users disclose only the minimally necessary subset of attributes required for authorization. Our protocol decouples attribute verification from key issuance: users first obtain cryptographically verifiable attribute tokens, and later issue blinded key requests over selectively chosen attributes. This design enables selective disclosure, supports reusable attribute credentials, and enhances user autonomy. To improve scalability, we introduce a lightweight batch verification mechanism that reduces computation and communication overhead for the attribute authority. We prove that our protocol achieves the binding and hiding properties under standard cryptographic assumptions, and we formally verify these guarantees in the symbolic model using the ProVerif tool. In addition, we propose two privacy metrics—Attribute Inference Gain (AIG) and Privacy Gain (PG)—alongside an entropy-based analysis to quantify resistance against attribute inference attacks. Experimental results show that our scheme effectively mitigates inference leakage while offering substantial efficiency gains compared to existing schemes.","PeriodicalId":13492,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security","volume":"21 ","pages":"2478-2491"},"PeriodicalIF":8.7000,"publicationDate":"2026-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11406190/","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) enables fine-grained access control over outsourced data, but its key generation process typically requires users to disclose their complete attribute sets, introducing significant privacy risks. Existing privacy-preserving approaches—such as those based on zero-knowledge proofs or tightly coupled interactive protocols—suffer from limited scalability, high communication costs, and insufficient support for selective attribute disclosure. To address these limitations, we propose a privacy-enhancing key generation protocol guided by the principle of Minimal Disclosure, which ensures that users disclose only the minimally necessary subset of attributes required for authorization. Our protocol decouples attribute verification from key issuance: users first obtain cryptographically verifiable attribute tokens, and later issue blinded key requests over selectively chosen attributes. This design enables selective disclosure, supports reusable attribute credentials, and enhances user autonomy. To improve scalability, we introduce a lightweight batch verification mechanism that reduces computation and communication overhead for the attribute authority. We prove that our protocol achieves the binding and hiding properties under standard cryptographic assumptions, and we formally verify these guarantees in the symbolic model using the ProVerif tool. In addition, we propose two privacy metrics—Attribute Inference Gain (AIG) and Privacy Gain (PG)—alongside an entropy-based analysis to quantify resistance against attribute inference attacks. Experimental results show that our scheme effectively mitigates inference leakage while offering substantial efficiency gains compared to existing schemes.
期刊介绍:
The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features