Zetetic Flyovers

Abstract

It has recently been argued that purported evidential and zetetic norms issue contradictory verdicts and that such contradictions best be resolved in favor of zetetic norms. The paper argues that this line of argument proves unsuccessful. First, natural formulations of what one ought to do if inquiring into a given matter resemble anankastic conditionals that don't allow for detachment of normatively significant verdicts. Second, even if suitably reformulated, zetetic norms issue, at best, verdicts with a distinctly practical flavor that contrasts with the epistemic flavor characteristic of evidential norms. While there are conflicts between normative verdicts of different flavors, the phenomenon is familiar and, in the cases in question, doesn't force a zetetic turn , that is, a reorientation of epistemology that gives zetetic norms precedence over evidential norms.