Power contestation and regulation in digital platform ecosystems-The case of the EU's Digital Markets Act.

IF 8.8 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Electronic Markets Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-13 DOI:10.1007/s12525-025-00858-9

Victorine Verlooy, Vincent Heimburg, Maximilian Schreieck, Manuel Wiesche

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this study, we investigate how power contestation between complementors and powerful platform owners unfolds in digital platform ecosystems as they come under regulatory scrutiny. Platform owners like Alphabet/Google, Apple, Amazon, and Meta/Facebook dominate their respective ecosystems, leveraging network effects and market power to maintain their positions, giving them a powerful advantage vis-à-vis supply-side complementors. Complementors have become increasingly dependent on these platforms and struggle due to their weakened position. In the EU, the European Commission has implemented the Digital Markets Act, which aims to increase fairness and contestability within and across digital platform ecosystems. Using a case study approach, we analyze how regulatory scrutiny, such as the Digital Markets Act, has affected power contestation between platform owners and complementors. In particular, we investigate app store and search platform ecosystems. We establish a conceptual framework of power contestation that shows how complementors and platform owners interact directly and through the regulator as a mediator, vying for power in the ecosystem. We thereby contribute to the emerging Information Systems literature on power dynamics and the regulation of digital platform ecosystems.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12525-025-00858-9.

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数字平台生态系统中的权力竞争与监管——以欧盟数字市场法案为例。

在这项研究中，我们调查了互补者和强大的平台所有者之间的权力竞争如何在数字平台生态系统中展开，因为它们受到监管审查。像Alphabet/ b谷歌、苹果、亚马逊和Meta/Facebook这样的平台所有者主导着各自的生态系统，利用网络效应和市场力量来维持自己的地位，使他们相对于-à-vis供应侧互补企业具有强大的优势。互补商越来越依赖这些平台，由于地位的削弱而陷入困境。在欧盟，欧盟委员会实施了《数字市场法案》，旨在提高数字平台生态系统内部和之间的公平性和可竞争性。通过案例研究的方法，我们分析了监管审查（如《数字市场法案》）如何影响平台所有者和互补商之间的权力竞争。我们特别调查了应用商店和搜索平台生态系统。我们建立了一个权力竞争的概念框架，展示了互补商和平台所有者如何直接互动，并通过监管机构作为调解人，在生态系统中争夺权力。因此，我们对权力动力学和数字平台生态系统监管的新兴信息系统文献做出了贡献。补充信息：在线版本包含补充资料，下载地址：10.1007/s12525-025-00858-9。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Electronic Markets Multiple-

CiteScore

14.80

自引率

15.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： Electronic Markets (EM) stands as a premier academic journal providing a dynamic platform for research into various forms of networked business. Recognizing the pivotal role of information and communication technology (ICT), EM delves into how ICT transforms the interactions between organizations and customers across diverse domains such as social networks, electronic commerce, supply chain management, and customer relationship management. Electronic markets, in essence, encompass the realms of networked business where multiple suppliers and customers engage in economic transactions within single or multiple tiers of economic value chains. This broad concept encompasses various forms, including allocation platforms with dynamic price discovery mechanisms, fostering atomistic relationships. Notable examples originate from financial markets (e.g., CBOT, XETRA) and energy markets (e.g., EEX, ICE). Join us in exploring the multifaceted landscape of electronic markets and their transformative impact on business interactions and dynamics.