Effects of multiple incentive policies on carbon information disclosure strategies of power battery: A complex network evolutionary game analysis

IF 10.6 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Lu Zhu , Juan He
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Power batteries are considered a key of electrification and low-carbon development in the transportation industry. Carbon information disclosure, as an environmental regulatory tool, plays a significant role in promoting carbon reduction efforts among power battery firms. While Chinese provinces and cities have introduced multiple policies to incentivize carbon information disclosure, existing research has paid limited attention to the impact of such incentive policies on power battery carbon information disclosure, particularly the effects of combined policy incentives. Therefore, this paper constructs a three-layer analytical framework integrating complex network topology association, evolutionary game strategy interaction, and policy combination scenario analysis to explore the effects of various subsidy policies (eg., carbon reduction subsidies) and financial policies (eg., disclosure support loans) and their combinations on carbon information disclosure by power battery firms. The study shows that both subsidy policies and financial policies can promote positive disclosure of carbon information for power batteries. However, financial policies alone have limited effects in promoting carbon information disclosure by power battery firms, and moderate subsidy policies are necessary. Policy combinations exhibit synergistic effects under certain conditions. Although pure subsidy-based combinations can effectively promote disclosure, they may increase the fiscal burden. It is advisable to transition gradually from pure subsidy-based combinations to “subsidy + financial” policy combinations. The three-layer analytical framework established in this study provides a reference for policymakers in making actual decisions.
多种激励政策对动力电池碳信息披露策略的影响:一个复杂网络进化博弈分析
动力电池被认为是交通运输行业电气化和低碳发展的关键。碳信息披露作为一种环境监管工具,对推动动力电池企业碳减排具有重要作用。虽然中国各省市出台了多种碳信息披露激励政策,但现有研究对这些激励政策对动力电池碳信息披露的影响,特别是政策激励组合的效果关注有限。为此,本文构建了一个集复杂网络拓扑关联、演化博弈策略交互、政策组合场景分析为一体的三层分析框架,探讨了不同补贴政策(如:(如碳减排补贴)和财政政策(如:(披露支持贷款)及其组合对动力电池企业碳信息披露的影响。研究表明,补贴政策和金融政策都能促进动力电池碳信息的积极披露。但单靠财政政策对动力电池企业碳信息披露的促进作用有限,需要适度的补贴政策。政策组合在一定条件下表现出协同效应。单纯以补贴为基础的合并虽然能有效促进披露,但也可能增加财政负担。建议从单纯的补贴型组合逐步过渡到“补贴+财政”的政策组合。本研究建立的三层分析框架为决策者在实际决策中提供了参考。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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