Ack Spoofing Attack in IEEE 802.11 Infrastructure WLANs: Strategies, Detection and Mitigation

Abstract

This paper investigates a vulnerability in IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, focusing on a MAC sublayer attack known as acknowledgement (Ack) spoofing. The paper delves into the distributed coordination function (DCF) and examines how Ack spoofing attacks affect network performance by manipulating the Ack operation essential for successful data exchange between stations. This manipulation disrupts Ack-based rate control mechanisms and the backoff procedure of the standard, leading to decreased performance for legitimate receivers with lossy links to access points. The paper introduces strategies to perform Ack spoofing attacks. To counter these threats, a novel detection and mitigation technique is proposed that effectively detects and mitigates any of the proposed attack strategies. The introduced technique is simple to implement, compatible with all versions of the existing IEEE 802.11 standard and all rate control mechanisms that rely on Ack frames in their operations. It also requires no modifications to the existing IEEE 802.11 standard, facilitating easy adoption by manufacturers. Moreover, it leverages a unique approach that avoids a cross-layer design, maintaining the integrity of layer abstraction. Through detailed simulations and analysis, the effectiveness of the proposed attack strategies and the detection and mitigation technique is demonstrated under various scenarios.