{"title":"A philosophical defence of limited foreknowledge open theism.","authors":"Marcus Ackermann","doi":"10.1007/s11153-025-09961-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Limited foreknowledge open theism (LFOT) is the view that there are contingent truths about the future but that even an omniscient God cannot foreknow them. This paper mounts a three-pronged philosophical defence of this doctrine. On the one hand, I will show that it can be given a formal model and semantics that is both <i>formally</i> and <i>descriptively</i> adequate. In doing so, I draw heavily on the most recent advancements in Thin Red Line semantics, and ultimately recommend a framework that combines familiar formal elements in a novel way: this places LFOT on a solid logical foundation. On the other hand, I will show that the two most prominent objections to LFOT, namely Todd's (Philosophia 42(2):523-538, 2014) <i>grounding objection</i> and Arbour's (Int J Philos Relig 73:189-207, 2013) <i>fatalistic objection</i>, can both be met. With respect to the former, we will see that the proponent of LFOT is (<i>pace</i> Todd) able to heed a suitable grounding requirement for future contingent truths. And as regards the latter, it will be demonstrated (<i>pace</i> Arbour) that LFOT does not entail logical fatalism. The upshot of this is that LFOT is, at least from a philosophical perspective, perfectly plausible.</p>","PeriodicalId":45180,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION","volume":"98 1-2","pages":"87-106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12476298/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-025-09961-5","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2025/7/22 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Limited foreknowledge open theism (LFOT) is the view that there are contingent truths about the future but that even an omniscient God cannot foreknow them. This paper mounts a three-pronged philosophical defence of this doctrine. On the one hand, I will show that it can be given a formal model and semantics that is both formally and descriptively adequate. In doing so, I draw heavily on the most recent advancements in Thin Red Line semantics, and ultimately recommend a framework that combines familiar formal elements in a novel way: this places LFOT on a solid logical foundation. On the other hand, I will show that the two most prominent objections to LFOT, namely Todd's (Philosophia 42(2):523-538, 2014) grounding objection and Arbour's (Int J Philos Relig 73:189-207, 2013) fatalistic objection, can both be met. With respect to the former, we will see that the proponent of LFOT is (pace Todd) able to heed a suitable grounding requirement for future contingent truths. And as regards the latter, it will be demonstrated (pace Arbour) that LFOT does not entail logical fatalism. The upshot of this is that LFOT is, at least from a philosophical perspective, perfectly plausible.
期刊介绍:
The organ of no single institution or sectarian school, philosophical or religious, the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion provides a medium for the exposition, development, and criticism of important philosophical insights and theories relevant to religion in any of its varied forms. It also provides a forum for critical, constructive, and interpretative consideration of religion from an objective philosophical point of view.
Articles, symposia, discussions, reviews, notes, and news in this journal are intended to serve the interests of a wide range of thoughtful readers, especially teachers and students of philosophy, philosophical theology and religious thought.
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