Governance of greenwashing in product circulation: from the perspective of commercial bribery

Abstract

Commercial bribery, as one of the means of unfair competition for enterprises, could be a potential risk leading to greenwashing. This paper focuses on the governance of corporate greenwashing and constructs an evolutionary game model between enterprise, media, government and consumer from the perspective of commercial bribery to analyze the mechanisms of interaction between the complex behaviors of different decision makers. In addition, this paper uses MATLAB to simulate three key factors (controlling collusion, optimizing reputation mechanisms and guiding active governance decisions) in different scenarios for a typical greenwashing enterprise. The findings reveal that commercial bribery directly influences the strategic choices of the media, government and consumer, while increasing the reputational effect of the media, improving the supervision positivity of lower-level government and optimizing the feedback mechanisms of consumers can break the chain of interests of multi-agent collusion in greenwashing. This paper supplements the relevant literature on commercial bribery and greenwashing research in the same framework, clarifying the chain of interests in which enterprises induce the media, government, and consumer to participate in greenwashing through commercial bribery. In addition, this paper deepens theoretical research on collaborative governance of commercial bribery and greenwashing from a multi-stakeholder perspective, improves the efficiency of corporate governance, and provides decision-making reference for achieving sustainable development.