An evolutionary game analysis of the promotion of shipborne low-temperature freezing technology for sea-caught shrimps among the government, fishermen, and consumers

Abstract

In the era of heightened focus on sustainable marine fisheries development, the Shipborne Low-Temperature Freezing Technology is crucial for enhancing the preservation effect of seafood, improving transportation efficiency, and reducing energy consumption. It plays a key role in the sustainable development of the fishery industry. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving fishermen, consumers, and the government by using evolutionary game theory, and analyzes the interaction mechanism of the behaviors of the three parties. Based on field survey data, through model derivation and simulation, with results as follows: (1) Government subsidies positively influence choices at both the production and consumption ends. They incentivize fishermen to adopt Shipborne Low-Temperature Freezing Technology for storing wild-caught shrimp products, while also encouraging consumers to purchase shrimp products preserved through this technology. (2) Government subsidy structures have complex effects on the strategic choices of both fishermen and consumers. Expanding subsidies to fishermen positively impacts the adoption of Shipborne Low-Temperature Freezing Technology. (3) An appropriate online sales ratio can generate positive cross-channel effects, enabling the game system to reach an optimal equilibrium. In this state: Fishermen spontaneously adopt Shipborne Low-Temperature Freezing Technology; Consumers voluntarily purchase wild-caught shrimp preserved with Shipborne Low-Temperature Freezing Technology; The government withdraws subsidies for both fishermen and consumers.