Raising the deterrent effect of the U.S. deferred prosecution agreement: New perspectives on the U.S. from the U.K. and Jersey

Abstract

Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) were introduced to enhance corporate accountability while mitigating the collateral consequences of full criminal prosecution. Yet, the U.S. practice has increasingly drawn criticism for reducing DPAs to convenient settlement devices, insufficiently aligned with their deterrent purpose. Monetary sanctions have proven inadequate in preventing recidivism, corporate self-monitoring remains unreliable, and the prosecution of culpable individuals is exceptionally rare. At the core of these deficiencies lies the limited scope of judicial oversight in the U.S. regime. This study situates its analysis within statutory, administrative, and emerging case law in the U.S., and draws comparative lessons from the more refined frameworks of the U.K. and Jersey— especially on substantive judicial scrutiny and mandatory self-reporting aspect. This study proposes to raise the standards and application of the U.S. DPA system by strengthening substantive judicial oversight, better incentivizing corporate self-reporting, and prosecuting corporate employees responsible for corporate crime.