Traceable Access Control Encryption With Parallel Multiple Sanitizers

Abstract

Access control encryption (ACE) is an innovative cryptographic primitive that realizes fine-grained read/write control of data and protects data privacy and security while facilitating the effective flow of information. However, existing ACE schemes face several limitations: 1) Inability to adequately mitigate the risks of a single point of failure in the sanitizer. 2) Lack of an effective accountability mechanism for disputes arising during the sanitization process. To solve these problems, this paper proposes the notion of traceable access control encryption with parallel multiple sanitizers for the first time and designs a specific structure of traceable parallel ACE to prevent the single point of failure, effectively deter abnormal sanitizer behaviors, and optimize system performance. Additionally, computationally intensive operations in the encryption and decryption processes are outsourced to third-party servers, resulting in a significant reduction of computational overhead. Furthermore, theoretical analysis and experimental simulations validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Comprehensive security analysis demonstrates its no-read security under the decisional q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assumption and its no-write security under the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption, ensuring its reliability in practical applications.