Do MA plans follow incentives to attract enrollee groups with new supplemental benefits?

IF 2.7
Health affairs scholar Pub Date : 2025-07-31 eCollection Date: 2025-09-01 DOI:10.1093/haschl/qxaf153
Katherine M Ianni, J Michael McWilliams, Vilsa E Curto
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Abstract

Introduction: The Medicare Advantage (MA) payment system gives rise to incentives for plans to attract and retain beneficiaries from minoritized racial and ethnic groups and those dually eligible for Medicaid (duals) by offering these groups additional benefits.

Methods: We examined how MA plans respond to these incentives using a 2020 policy change that granted broader flexibility in benefit design, allowing plans to offer Special Supplemental Benefits for the Chronically Ill (SSBCI).

Results: We found that plans with higher shares of patients from these groups were more likely to offer SSBCI benefits: a 1 SD increase in a plan's non-White share was associated with a 20.8% point (P < .01) increase in the probability that the plan offered any SSBCI benefit. We found stronger associations in more competitive markets and for groups that can be more easily targeted with additional benefit offerings. We also found that Special Needs Plans (SNPs), which largely enroll duals, are more likely to offer SSBCI benefits than non-SNPs.

Conclusion: These findings are consistent with the potential for population-based payment systems to shift resources towards underserved groups in ways that could encourage plans or providers to mitigate health care disparities; they also highlight the challenges and tradeoffs involved.

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MA计划是否遵循激励措施,以新的补充福利吸引参保团体?
简介:医疗保险优势(MA)支付系统通过提供额外的福利,激励计划吸引和留住少数种族和民族群体以及有资格享受医疗补助的双重群体的受益人。方法:我们使用2020年的政策变化来研究MA计划如何应对这些激励措施,该政策变化赋予福利设计更大的灵活性,允许计划为慢性病患者提供特殊补充福利(SSBCI)。结果:我们发现,来自这些组的患者比例较高的计划更有可能提供SSBCI益处:一个计划的非怀特份额每增加1个标准差,该计划提供任何SSBCI益处的可能性增加20.8% (P < 0.01)。我们发现,在竞争更激烈的市场中,对于那些更容易提供额外福利的群体,这种联系更强。我们还发现,与非snp相比,特殊需要计划(SNPs)更有可能提供SSBCI福利。结论:这些发现与基于人群的支付系统将资源转移到服务不足群体的潜力是一致的,这种方式可以鼓励计划或提供者减轻医疗保健差距;他们还强调了所涉及的挑战和权衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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