Partial vertical ownership cooperation between manufacturers and sharing economy platforms

IF 6 2区 管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Fei Ye, Debing Ni, Kevin W. Li, Xiang Fang
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Abstract

Given that manufacturers increasingly enter the sharing economy market via equity investment in third-party sharing platforms, this paper establishes a game-theoretical model to characterize such partial vertical ownership (PVO) cooperation. We consider a manufacturer (M) interacting with a retailer (R) and sharing economy platform (SEP), where M first negotiates a transfer payment to SEP for their PVO cooperation and, then, employs two wholesale price contracts for SEP and R to induce operational interactions. We obtain the following results. First, the PVO cooperation level affects SEP’s selection of a P2P or hybrid business model only if M’s marginal sales cost to SEP is moderate. Second, the negotiated transfer payment from M to SEP increases (is constant) in its cooperation level if M’s capital constraint on the transfer payment is non-binding (binding), but it is always strictly lower than the operational profit distribution from SEP to M. Third, without M’s capital constraint, PVO cooperation is always achievable and given a negotiated transfer payment for this cooperation, a higher PVO cooperation level benefits M, R, SEP, consumers, and the social planner, but PVO cooperation is attainable only if its level is capped within a reasonable range under a binding capital constraint for M. Therefore, M, R, and SEP should enhance PVO cooperation to improve overall supply chain efficiency. Moreover, the transfer payment for PVO cooperation does not satisfy the equal value principle typically applicable to arm’s length transactions, as the equity exchange between M and SEP must consider their ensuing operational interactions.
厂商与共享经济平台之间的部分垂直所有权合作
鉴于制造商越来越多地通过对第三方共享平台的股权投资进入共享经济市场,本文建立了一个博弈论模型来描述这种部分垂直所有权(PVO)合作。我们考虑一个制造商(M)与零售商(R)和共享经济平台(SEP)互动,其中M首先为他们的PVO合作向SEP协商转移支付,然后为SEP和R使用两个批发价格合同来诱导操作交互。我们得到以下结果。首先,只有当M对SEP的边际销售成本适中时,PVO的合作水平才会影响SEP对P2P或混合商业模式的选择。第二,当M对转移支付的资本约束不具有约束力(有约束力)时,M对SEP的协商转移支付在合作水平上增加(不变),但始终严格低于SEP对M的经营利润分配。第三,在没有M的资本约束的情况下,PVO合作始终是可以实现的,并且在对这种合作进行协商转移支付的情况下,更高的PVO合作水平对M、R、SEP、消费者和社会规划者都有利。但是,只有在M具有约束力的资本约束下,将PVO合作的水平限制在合理的范围内,才能实现PVO合作。因此,M、R和SEP应该加强PVO合作,以提高整体供应链效率。此外,PVO合作的转移支付并不满足通常适用于公平交易的等值原则,因为M与SEP之间的股权交换必须考虑其后续的业务互动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
European Journal of Operational Research
European Journal of Operational Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
11.90
自引率
9.40%
发文量
786
审稿时长
8.2 months
期刊介绍: The European Journal of Operational Research (EJOR) publishes high quality, original papers that contribute to the methodology of operational research (OR) and to the practice of decision making.
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