Malignity in decentralization of natural resource governance in India

Abstract

Many perspectives have been offered on what induces policy failures, which have been numerously called malignity, policy volatility, ill-intentioned policy behavior, abuse of public authority, prioritizing the interests of specific influential or identity interests, subverting policy goals and targets, and rent-seeking. Such a dark side of policy design is seen in India’s rollout of decentralization for natural resources. A discussion on malignant policy designs across states and sectors highlights the importance of understanding the political economy of institutional designs. This article points out that failing to account for the political economy of policy design for decentralization results in malignant designs. It also provides insights into developing policy designs to mitigate the influences of the erstwhile beneficiaries of centralization. The article brings insights from decentralization designs within a political economy framework and discusses mechanisms to mitigate malignant decentralization designs. It points to key policy design and implementation moments that create malignant behavior. It shares comparative instances where policies have been adapted to curb such behavior and strengthen devolutionary decentralization. It details how well-intended national policies towards devolutionary decentralization are intertwined with state and sub-state-level micro-politics of institutional design and decentralization.