Legal personhood and legal capacity: the case of the locked-in syndrome.

Abstract

The situation of persons diagnosed with locked-in syndrome (LIS) raises a significant legal challenge. As a consequence of a brainstem stroke, they are quadriplegic and lack articulate speech but have normal visual perception, bodily sensations, consciousness, and cognitive functions. It is only with human and technological assistance that they can communicate, express their will, make responsible decisions, and exert their civil rights. Insofar as they can communicate, there seems in principle to be no reason for restricting their legal capacity. This, however, has not always been recognized. In the early 2000s in Spain, two men with LIS who had been declared 'incapable' and deprived of their civil rights reclaimed them in court. Rights were given back to the one who could use a computer. They were initially refused to the other, who communicated solely by blinking and depended on a human intermediary. Only the human-machine system was trusted to convey faithfully and reliably the subject's autonomous will. This article describes these two cases in their legal context and discusses how they can throw light on the exercise of legal capacity by persons with disabilities after the adoption in 2006 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.