Intrusion Detection System for Electronic Health Record Sharing in Consumer-Centric Healthcare Devices Using Attribute-Based Encryption

Abstract

To address the challenges of inflexible privilege changes and vulnerability to collusion attacks in electronic health record (EHR) sharing, this paper proposes a multi-authority system designed to resist such attacks on consumer-centric healthcare devices. The system achieves attribute revocation through version control, where the attribute authority provides updated keys to non-revoked users and updates the ciphertext, ensuring that users without the updated keys can no longer access the data. To optimize data access efficiency, the scheme offloads most computations to the cloud server. Each attribute authority generates its own public-private key pair to prevent collusion attacks. Security analysis demonstrates that the scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attacks under the concrete cryptographic assumptions model. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme significantly reduces decryption overhead, achieving at least a 52.56% reduction compared to existing multi-authority schemes.