Collaboration or Capture? Unpacking the Notion of Forest Governance in Madhupur and Lawachara Forests of Bangladesh

Abstract

Co-management has widely been advocated as a means to address power imbalances in conservation, yet its implementation often reinforces existing inequalities rather than fostering equitable collaboration. However, this qualitative study, based on evidence from Madhupur and Lawachara forests in Bangladesh, demonstrates that the model functions more as a mechanism of control than genuine collaboration. Despite the rhetoric of community participation, the Forest Department (FD) retains authority by bypassing democratic processes—such as withholding support for local elections—and co-opting local elites to maintain its dominance. While a few forest users receive limited incentives, they lack decision-making power and face exclusion if they dissent. Institutions remain deliberately fragile and dependent on the FD, enabling the state and its allied elites to exploit marginalized communities through patronage networks and corrupt practices, including the strategic inclusion of forest offenders as defenders to maintain illicit control. This form of “administrative co-management” facilitates both elite and regulatory capture, undermining the intended objectives of equity and empowerment. The study recommends the establishment of robust regulatory frameworks with enforceable accountability mechanisms, meaningful decentralization with real devolution of power, and adequate livelihood support for forest-dependent communities. Embedding anti-corruption safeguards and ensuring transparency in co-management processes are essential for restoring trust and transforming forest governance from a tool of capture into one of genuine collaboration.