The risk of biological race.

IF 1 3区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Celso Neto
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. In recent years, Quayshawn Spencer has offered one of the most elaborate versions of that view, but his theory faces several problems (Spencer in Philos Stud 159:181-204, 2012; Spencer in J Philos 111:1-23, 2014; Spencer in 52:46-55, 2015; Spencer in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019a; Hochman in J Philos 110:331-351, 2013; Glasgow et al. in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Jackson in Philos Theory Pract Biol 14, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630 ; Winsberg in Biol Philos 37:46, 2022; Msimang in Philos Pap 51:115-145, 2022; Kalewold in Metaphysics of race, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2024; Berenstain forthcoming). In this paper, I raise another problem for Spencer's BRR, arguing that his theory does not fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. Spencer's BRR involves significant epistemic and ethical risks, and these risks indirectly impact Spencer's metaphysical conclusions. I rely on the "science and values" literature to show this and engage with STS and anthropology literature (Douglas in Inductive risk and values in science, 2000. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c ; Douglas in Science, policy, and the value-free ideal, Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, 2009; Brown in Philos Sci 80:829-839, 2013; Brown in Current controversies in values and science, Routledge, Milton Park, 2017; Biddle and Kukla Explor Induc Risk Case Stud Values Sci 1:215-238, 2017; Elliot and Richards in Exploring inductive risk: case studies of values in science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017). This analysis raises broader questions about the relationship between values, social responsibility, and metaphysics. Previous criticisms of Spencer's BRR have barely touched on those questions. Hence, by critically discussing problems with Spencer's already troubled view, my main goal is to open the debate for such important questions.

生物种族的风险。
生物种族现实主义(以下简称BRR)认为人类在生物学上形成了不同的群体。近年来,Quayshawn Spencer提出了这一观点最详尽的版本之一,但他的理论面临着几个问题(Spencer In Philos Stud 159:181-204, 2012;[J]中华医学杂志,2014;Spencer在52:46-55,2015;斯宾塞在格拉斯哥,哈斯兰格,杰弗斯,斯宾塞(编)什么是种族?《四种哲学观》,牛津大学出版社,牛津,2019a;《中华医学杂志》,2013;格拉斯哥等人在格拉斯哥,哈斯兰格,杰弗斯,斯宾塞(编)什么是种族?《四种哲学观》,牛津大学出版社,牛津,2019;《哲学理论与实践》第14期,2022年。https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630;Winsberg in Biol philo 37:46, 2022;《哲学》51:115-145,2022;《种族形而上学》,剑桥大学出版社,剑桥,2024年;Berenstain即将出版)。在本文中,我对斯宾塞的BRR提出了另一个问题,认为他的理论没有充分考虑社会、政治和道德价值观如何影响种族形而上学。斯宾塞的BRR涉及重大的认知和伦理风险,这些风险间接影响了斯宾塞的形而上学结论。我依靠“科学与价值”文献来证明这一点,并参与STS和人类学文献(道格拉斯在科学中的归纳风险和价值,2000年)。http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c;道格拉斯:《科学、政策和价值自由的理想》,匹兹堡大学出版社,2009年;科学通报,2013;《布朗论当前价值与科学的争议》,劳特利奇出版社,米尔顿公园,2017年;石油学报(自然科学版),2017;埃利奥特和理查兹在探索归纳风险:科学价值的案例研究,牛津大学出版社,牛津,2017年)。这种分析提出了关于价值观、社会责任和形而上学之间关系的更广泛的问题。先前对斯宾塞BRR的批评几乎没有触及这些问题。因此,通过批判性地讨论斯宾塞已经陷入困境的观点,我的主要目标是为这些重要问题开启辩论。
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来源期刊
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 综合性期刊-科学史与科学哲学
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
5.00%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences is an interdisciplinary journal committed to providing an integrative approach to understanding the life sciences. It welcomes submissions from historians, philosophers, biologists, physicians, ethicists and scholars in the social studies of science. Contributors are expected to offer broad and interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of biology, biomedicine and related fields, especially as these perspectives illuminate the foundations, development, and/or implications of scientific practices and related developments. Submissions which are collaborative and feature different disciplinary approaches are especially encouraged, as are submissions written by senior and junior scholars (including graduate students).
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