The cost of misaligned incentives in the pharmaceutical supply chain.

IF 2.7
Health affairs scholar Pub Date : 2025-06-25 eCollection Date: 2025-07-01 DOI:10.1093/haschl/qxaf126
Geoffrey Joyce
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Abstract

Recent concerns over rising drug prices have focused on the role of pharmacy benefit managers or PBMs. While multiple players make up the pharmaceutical supply chain, PBMs are the conductors who effectively decide which drugs are covered and at what cost. Most PBM contracts tie their compensation to a percentage of a drug's list price, creating a financial incentive to favor high-cost, high-rebate drugs on plan formularies at the expense of lower-cost generics and biosimilars. Furthermore, the PBM industry is highly concentrated and vertically integrated with the country's largest health insurers, making it even harder to assess PBM performance and profitability. A simple analysis of annual drug spending at different reporting levels provides important insight into where the money goes and where savings could be achieved. We find that simply delinking compensation to the list price of a drug throughout the supply chain could reduce annual drug spending by more than $95b or nearly 15% of net spending without adversely affecting manufacturers' incentive to innovate.

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药品供应链中不一致激励的成本。
最近对药品价格上涨的担忧主要集中在药品福利管理机构(PBMs)的作用上。虽然药品供应链由多个参与者组成,但药品福利管理机构是有效决定涵盖哪些药物以及价格的指挥者。大多数药品福利管理合同将他们的薪酬与药品目录价格的一定比例挂钩,这就形成了一种财政激励,促使他们在计划处方中选择高成本、高回扣的药物,而牺牲低成本的仿制药和生物仿制药。此外,PBM行业高度集中,并与该国最大的健康保险公司垂直整合,这使得评估PBM的绩效和盈利能力变得更加困难。对不同报告级别的年度药品支出进行简单分析,可以提供重要的见解,了解资金的去向以及可以在哪些方面实现节省。我们发现,在整个供应链中,简单地将薪酬与药品标价脱钩,就可以在不影响制造商创新动机的情况下,减少每年超过950亿美元的药品支出,相当于净支出的近15%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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