Multi-channel retailer’s financing strategy in a green supply chain: Third-party platform credit financing versus bank credit financing

Xueping Zhen , Xinran Li , Dan Shi , Zixi Zhang
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Abstract

With the rapid development of third-party platforms, more and more retailers sell their green products on the third-party platform in addition to their offline channel. The additional demand generated from the third-party platform may impose greater capital pressure on the retailer. In response, some third-party platforms offer financing service to capital-constrained retailers sell on them. Therefore, we establish a Stackelberg game-theoretic model where a manufacturer sells green products to a capital-constrained retailer which has an offline channel and a third-party platform channel. Two financing strategies are considered: bank credit financing (BF) and third-party platform credit financing (TF). The manufacturer as the leader first determines the wholesale price and the lender (bank or the third-party platform) then sets an interest rate. The retailer finally decides the retail price. Our theoretical analysis shows that for the manufacturer, retailer and third-party platform, TF strategy is better than BF strategy. That is, TF strategy is a win-win strategy. Specifically, under the TF strategy, the retail price or the interest rate are lower compared to the BF strategy, while the wholesale price under TF is higher. Additionally, our finding shows that the revenue sharing rate has no impact on the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision under TF strategy, whereas under the BF strategy, the wholesale price decreases as the revenue sharing rate increases. We also find that the retail price increases with the revenue sharing rate under BF, but decreases under TF strategy.
绿色供应链下多渠道零售商的融资策略:第三方平台信用融资vs银行信用融资
随着第三方平台的快速发展,越来越多的零售商在线下渠道的基础上,通过第三方平台销售绿色产品。第三方平台产生的额外需求可能会给零售商带来更大的资金压力。作为回应,一些第三方平台为资金紧张的零售商提供融资服务。因此,我们建立了制造商向拥有线下渠道和第三方平台渠道的资金受限的零售商销售绿色产品的Stackelberg博弈论模型。本文考虑了两种融资策略:银行信用融资(BF)和第三方平台信用融资(TF)。制造商作为领导者首先确定批发价格,然后贷款人(银行或第三方平台)设定利率。零售商最终决定零售价格。理论分析表明,对于制造商、零售商和第三方平台而言,TF策略优于BF策略。也就是说,TF策略是一种双赢策略。具体而言,在TF策略下,零售价格或利率较BF策略低,而在TF策略下批发价格较高。此外,我们的研究结果表明,在TF策略下,收入分成率对制造商的批发价格决策没有影响,而在BF策略下,批发价格随着收入分成率的增加而下降。我们还发现,在BF策略下,零售价格随着收入分成率的增加而增加,而在TF策略下,零售价格下降。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
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