Financial expert CEOs: Evidence from purchase price allocation

IF 3.3 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation Pub Date : 2025-06-27 DOI:10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2025.100711

Francesca Rossignoli , Saverio Bozzolan , Andrea Lionzo

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Drawing from the Upper Echelons Theory (UET), this study assesses how firms’ accounting outcomes at the transaction level are influenced by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s individual characteristic of financial expertise and managerial status from structural and relational power. We use Purchase Price Allocation (PPA) as a key empirical context, given its technical nature. Utilizing a proprietary dataset that includes information on business combination and key officers’ characteristics, we employ multivariate analysis to explore the relationship between the CEO financial expertise and reporting transparency, and the moderating role of the CEO’s power. Our findings indicate that firms led by financial expert CEOs are more likely to allocate the purchase price to specific assets. Furthermore, CEOs’ structural power enhances the impact of financial expertise on PPA decisions, whereas relational power does not support a similar effect. Robustness checks confirm the validity of our results. This research contributes to the accounting literature by extending UET predictions, highlighting that accounting outcomes are systematically influenced by CEO financial expertise and illustrating how different managerial status within corporate governance affect financial reporting transparency.

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财务专家ceo：来自购买价格分配的证据

本研究借鉴上层梯队理论（UET），从结构权力和关系权力的角度，评估了首席执行官（CEO）的财务专业知识和管理地位的个人特征如何影响企业在交易层面的会计结果。鉴于其技术性质，我们使用购买价格分配（PPA）作为关键的实证背景。利用专有数据集，包括企业合并和关键高管特征信息，我们采用多元分析来探索CEO财务专业知识与报告透明度之间的关系，以及CEO权力的调节作用。我们的研究结果表明，由财务专家首席执行官领导的公司更有可能将购买价格分配给特定资产。此外，ceo的结构权力增强了财务专业知识对PPA决策的影响，而关系权力不支持类似的影响。稳健性检查证实了我们的结果的有效性。本研究通过扩展UET预测对会计文献做出贡献，强调会计结果受到CEO财务专业知识的系统影响，并说明公司治理中不同的管理地位如何影响财务报告透明度。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.50

自引率

3.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation publishes articles which deal with most areas of international accounting including auditing, taxation and management accounting. The journal''s goal is to bridge the gap between academic researchers and practitioners by publishing papers that are relevant to the development of the field of accounting. Submissions are expected to make a contribution to the accounting literature, including as appropriate the international accounting literature typically found in JIAAT and other primary US-based international accounting journals as well as in leading European accounting journals. Applied research findings, critiques of current accounting practices and the measurement of their effects on business decisions, general purpose solutions to problems through models, and essays on world affairs which affect accounting practice are all within the scope of the journal.